| Revision as of 18:46, 18 January 2021 editNovem Linguae (talk | contribs)Edit filter managers, Interface administrators, Administrators51,111 editsm MOSTag: Visual edit← Previous edit |
Latest revision as of 19:36, 13 December 2022 edit undoCewbot (talk | contribs)Bots7,900,245 editsm Fixing broken anchor: 2022-03-02 #The Cambridge Working Group→Gain-of-function research#Cambridge Working GroupTag: Redirect target changed |
| (38 intermediate revisions by 19 users not shown) |
| Line 1: |
Line 1: |
|
|
#REDIRECT ] |
|
<!-- Please do not remove or change this AfD message until the discussion has been closed. --> |
|
|
|
{{Redirect category shell| |
|
{{Article for deletion/dated|page=The Cambridge Working Group|timestamp=20210116003117|year=2021|month=January|day=16|substed=yes|help=off}} |
|
|
|
{{R from merge}} |
|
<!-- Once discussion is closed, please place on talk page: {{Old AfD multi|page=The Cambridge Working Group|date=16 January 2021|result='''keep'''}} --> |
|
|
|
{{R to section}} |
|
<!-- End of AfD message, feel free to edit beyond this point --> |
|
|
|
}} |
|
{{notability|date=January 2021}} |
|
|
|
|
|
{{use mdy dates|date=January 2021}} |
|
|
|
|
|
The '''Cambridge Working Group''' is a group of ] scientists and ] experts concerned with the biosafety risks of creating novel potential pandemic pathogens for research purposes.<ref>https://www.lemonde.fr/sciences/article/2014/10/20/la-maison-blanche-fait-volte-face-sur-les-frankenvirus_4509133_1650684.html</ref><ref>https://oglobo.globo.com/sociedade/saude/cientistas-pedem-limite-criacao-de-virus-mortais-em-laboratorio-13281731</ref><ref><https://thebulletin.org/2014/08/making-viruses-in-the-lab-deadlier-and-more-able-to-spread-an-accident-waiting-to-happen/</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2014/07/scientists-call-limit-creating-dangerous-pathogens|title=Scientists call for limit on creating dangerous pathogens|date=July 15, 2014|website=Science | AAAS}}</ref> The group has engaged in public advocacy, influencing the US Government's decision in Dec 2015 to issue a moratorium on research creating novel potential pandemic pathogens.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Lipsitch|first1=Marc|last2=Inglesby|first2=Thomas V.|date=December 12, 2014|title=Moratorium on Research Intended To Create Novel Potential Pandemic Pathogens|url=https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4271556/|journal=mBio|volume=5|issue=6|doi=10.1128/mBio.02366-14|pmc=4271556|pmid=25505122|via=PubMed Central}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|date=October 17, 2014|title=U.S. halts funding for new risky virus studies, calls for voluntary moratorium|url=https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2014/10/us-halts-funding-new-risky-virus-studies-calls-voluntary-moratorium|website=Science | AAAS}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=Could Coronavirus Have Escaped from a Lab? | bostonmagazine.com|url=https://www.bostonmagazine.com/news/2020/09/09/alina-chan-broad-institute-coronavirus/}}</ref><ref>https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevensalzberg/2019/03/04/scientists-restart-research-on-creating-deadly-bird-flu-with-nihs-blessing/?sh=2e44c1235edd</ref> In December 2017, the three-year moratorium expired.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Begley,STAT|first=Sharon|title=U.S. Lifts Moratorium on Funding Controversial, High-Risk Virus Research|url=https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/u-s-lifts-moratorium-on-funding-controversial-high-risk-virus-research/|website=Scientific American}}</ref> |
|
|
|
|
|
The group was formed by Harvard epidemiologist ] at a meeting held in Cambridge, Massachusetts, following a "trifecta" of biosecurity incidents involving the ], including the accidental exposure of viable anthrax to personnel at CDC's Roybal Campus, the discovery of six vials containing viable smallpox from the 1950s mislabeled as Variola at the FDA's White Oak campus, and the accidental shipping of H9N2 vials contaminated with H5N1 from the CDC lab to a USDA lab.<ref>https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/bio-unsafety-level-3-could-the-next-lab-accident-result-in-a-pandemic/</ref><ref>https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/18/anthrax-bird-flu-dangers-lax-security-disease-control-labs</ref><ref>https://www.startribune.com/summit-is-needed-on-troubling-research/267725831/</ref><ref>https://www.wired.com/2014/07/cdc-accidents-hearing/</ref><ref>https://www.nature.com/news/safety-lapses-in-us-government-labs-spark-debate-1.15570</ref> On July 14, 2014, the group published a Consensus Statement with 18 original signatories and founding members. Within the first two months of publishing the Consensus Statement, 50 more Charter Members signed, and has since been signed by over 100 additional scientists. |
|
|
|
|
|
The group advocates for devising safer research methods that would meet the same research objectives.<ref>https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article/authors?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1001646</ref> |
|
|
|
|
|
== Background == |
|
|
|
|
|
Scientists have performed "gain of function" studies as an experimentation tool for decades, such as "passaging" a virus in a host that it wouldn't usually infect in order generate attenuated strains for use in vaccines. This was done for the ]. |
|
|
|
|
|
The Cambridge Working Group is not concerned so much with "gain of function" studies in the general, but of applying the tool to creating variants with increased transmissibility and virulence among mammals that could also affect humans in the case of a deliberate or accidental lab release. |
|
|
|
|
|
Dr ] founding editor-in-chief of the ], a scientific journal published by the ] and Michael Imperiale, another editor of the journal, both of who signed the Consensus Statement, said gain of function experiments can yield important information, particularly about flu viruses, but that the research poses risks. As an example, they cited the strong circumstantial evidence indicating that ] resulted from a lab accident. Other lapses they noted involved ] and ] from ] labs, and infections of lab workers with ] and ] species.<ref>https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2014/08/experts-urge-gain-function-sides-seek-common-ground</ref><ref>https://www.vox.com/2014/7/21/5913267/the-cdc-left-anthrax-vials-in-a-fridge-heres-why-that-could-be-good/in/5686836</ref> |
|
|
|
|
|
In an interview with the New York Times, ], a molecular biologist and laboratory director at ], who also signed the Consensus Statement said he had “no confidence” in the safety of the many labs that have sprung up since 2001, citing the need for increased oversight over their management.<ref>https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/20/science/pathogen-mishaps-rise-as-labs-proliferate-with-scant-regulation.html</ref> |
|
|
|
|
|
== Opposing position == |
|
|
|
|
|
Shortly after the Cambridge Working Group released its position statement, Scientists for Science was formed by 37 signatories taking an opposing position.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Edelmann|first=Achim|last2=Moody|first2=James|last3=Light|first3=Ryan|date=2017-05-24|title=Disparate foundations of scientists’ policy positions on contentious biomedical research|url=https://www.pnas.org/content/early/2017/05/23/1613580114|journal=]|language=en|volume=|pages=|doi=10.1073/pnas.1613580114|issn=0027-8424|pmid=28559310|via=|doi-access=free}}</ref> The group's founder, Paul Duprex, said that studies on risky germs are already subject to extensive regulations saying that the it would be better to focus more on lab safetey, not limiting the types of experiments that can be done.<ref>https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2014/08/13/339854400/biologists-choose-sides-in-safety-debate-over-lab-made-pathogens/</ref> Columbia University virologist ], who signed both statements, said "there has to be a coming together of what should be done".<ref>https://www.sciencemagazinedigital.org/sciencemagazine/05_september_2014?folio=1112&pg=20#pg20</ref> |
|
|
|
|
|
== Members == |
|
|
|
|
|
=== Founding members === |
|
|
The original founding members from 2014 are:<ref></ref> |
|
|
# ] of the University of Ottawa |
|
|
# ] of Harvard University |
|
|
# ] of the Albert Einstein College of Medicine |
|
|
# ] or Rutgers University |
|
|
# ] of the University of Pennsylvania |
|
|
# David Fisman of the University of Toronto |
|
|
# ] of Yale School of Public Health |
|
|
# Peter Hale of the Foundation for Vaccine Research |
|
|
# ] of Third World Network |
|
|
# Michael Imperiale of the University of Michigan |
|
|
# ] of the UPMC Center for Health Security |
|
|
#], Harvard School of Public Health |
|
|
# ] of the University of Minnesota/CIDRAP |
|
|
# ] of Stanford University |
|
|
# ] (Nobel Laureate '93) of New England Biolabs |
|
|
# ] of the Pennsylvania State University |
|
|
# Lone Simonsen of the George Washington University |
|
|
# ] of the University of Freiburg Institute of Public Law |
|
|
|
|
|
=== Additional members === |
|
|
Some additional members include: |
|
|
* ] from Harvard Medical School |
|
|
* ] of Imperial College |
|
|
* ] of Columbia University |
|
|
* ] of the University of Edinburgh, UK |
|
|
* ] of Johns Hopkins University |
|
|
* Klaus Stöhr, a former WHO official who pressed for efforts pandemics preparedness |
|
|
|
|
|
== See also == |
|
|
|
|
|
*] |
|
|
|
|
|
==References== |
|
|
{{Reflist}} |
|
|
|
|
|
==External links== |
|
|
* The |
|
|
|
|
|
{{DEFAULTSORT:Cambridge Working Group}} |
|
|
] |
|
|
] |
|
|
] |
|
|
] |
|
|
] |
|
|
] |
|
|
] |
|