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Gulf War
File:M-3 Bradley cavalry fighting vehicle from the 2d Squadron, 4th Cavalry (24th Infantry Division).jpg M3 Bradley of 2nd Squadron, 4th Cavalry. 19th December 1990.
Date August 2, 1990 – February 28, 1991 Location Persian Gulf Result Decisive Coalition victory, liberation of Kuwait.
Belligerents
UN Coalition	Republic of Iraq
Commanders and leaders
Norman Schwarzkopf	Saddam Hussein
Strength
660,000	360,000
Casualties and losses
345 dead, 1,000 wounded	25,000 dead, 75,000 wounded

The Gulf War (1990–1991) (also called the Persian Gulf War, Operation Desert Storm, or Second Gulf War) was a conflict between Iraq and a coalition force of approximately 20 nations led by the United States and mandated by the United Nations in order to liberate Kuwait.

The war began with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, following Iraqi contentions that Kuwait was illegally slant-drilling petroleum across Iraq’s border.

The invasion was met with immediate economic sanctions by the United Nations against Iraq. Hostilities commenced in January 1991, resulting in a decisive victory for the coalition forces, which drove Iraqi forces out of Kuwait with minimal coalition deaths. The main battles were aerial and ground combat within Iraq, Kuwait, and bordering areas of Saudi Arabia. The war did not expand outside the immediate Iraq/Kuwait/Saudi border region, although Iraq fired missiles on Israeli cities.

Name

Gulf War and Persian Gulf War are the most common Western terms for the conflict, used by majority of historians and journalists. Since Operation Iraqi Freedom and the American occupation of Iraq, the 1991 conflict is often referred to as "Gulf War I" or the "First Persian Gulf War", also known to Americans as Operations Desert Shield (defending Saudi territory) and Desert Storm (offensives against Iraq) and to the British as Operation Granby; however, Americans have been known to use the name Desert Storm to refer to military action conducted during Desert Shield.

Kuwaitis and most Arab coalition members refer to the conflict as Harb Tahrir al-Kuwait or "The War of Kuwait's Liberation". In Iraq, the war is often colloquially called Um M’aārak — "The Mother of All Battles", also occasionally referred to as the "Hundred Hours' War", in reference to the speed at which coalition forces defeated the Iraqi forces in the ground combat.

Causes

Historical split

Prior to World War I, under the Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1913, Kuwait was considered to be an autonomous caza within Ottoman Iraq. Following the war, Kuwait fell under British rule which treated Kuwait and Iraq as separate countries known as emirates. However, Iraqi officials did not accept the legitimacy of Kuwaiti independence or the authority of the Kuwaiti Emir. Iraq never recognized Kuwait's sovereignty and in the 1960s, the United Kingdom deployed troops to Kuwait to deter an Iraqi annexation.

Iraqi debts to Kuwait

During the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, Kuwait was allied with Iraq, largely due to desiring Iraqi protection from Shia Iran. After the war, Iraq was heavily indebted to several Arab countries, including a $14 billion debt to Kuwait. Iraq hoped to repay its debts by raising the price of petroleum through OPEC oil production cuts, but instead, Kuwait increased production, lowering prices, in an attempt to leverage a better resolution of their border dispute. In addition, Iraq began to accuse Kuwait of slant drilling into neighboring Iraqi oil fields, and furthermore charged that it had performed a collective service for all Arabs by acting as a buffer against Iran (Persia) and that therefore Kuwait and Saudi Arabia should negotiate or cancel Iraq's war debts. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s primary twofold justification for the war was a blend of the assertion of Kuwaiti territory being an Iraqi province arbitrarily cut off by imperialism, with the use of annexation as retaliation for the "economic warfare" Kuwait had waged through slant drilling into Iraq’s oil supplies while it had been under Iraqi protection.

The war with Iran had also seen the destruction of almost all of Iraq’s port facilities on the Persian Gulf, cutting off Iraq’s main trade outlet. Many in Iraq, expecting a resumption of war with Iran in the future, felt that Iraq’s security could only be guaranteed by controlling more of the Persian Gulf Coast, including more secure ports. Kuwait thus made a tempting target.

Ideological justification

Ideologically, the invasion of Kuwait was justified through calls to Arab nationalism. Kuwait was described as a natural part of Iraq carved off by British imperialism. It had originally been under the mandate of the Ottoman governor of Basra and had only been defined as an independent nation when Sir Percy Cox drew up the border in 1922. The annexation of Kuwait was described as a step on the way to greater Arab union. Other reasons were given as well. Hussein presented it as a way to restore the empire of Babylon in addition to the Arab nationalist rhetoric. The invasion was also closely tied to other events in the Middle East. The First Intifada by the Palestinians was raging, and most Arab states, including Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, were dependent on Western military alliances. Hussein thus presented himself as the one Arab statesman willing to stand up to Israel and the United States.

Pre-war Iraqi-American relations

Pre Iran-Iraq war

To the US, Iran-Iraqi relations were stable, and Iraq had been chiefly an ally of the Soviet Union. The U.S. was concerned with Iraq’s belligerence toward Israel and disapproval of moves towards peace with other Arab states. It also condemned Iraqi support for various Arab and Palestinian militant groups such as Abu Nidal, which led to its inclusion on the incipient U.S. list of state sponsors of international terrorism on December 29, 1979. The U.S. remained officially neutral during the outbreak of hostilities in the Iran-Iraq War, as it had previously been humiliated by a 444 day long Iranian hostage crisis and expected that Iran was not likely to win. In March 1982, however, Iran began a successful counteroffensive (Operation Undeniable Victory). In a bid to open the possibility of relations to Iraq, the country was removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. Ostensibly this was because of improvement in the regime’s record, although former United States Assistant Secretary of Defense Noel Koch later stated, "No one had any doubts about continued involvement in terrorism... The real reason was to help them succeed in the war against Iran." With Iran's newfound success in the war and its rebuff of a peace offer in July, arms sales from other states (most importantly the USSR, France, Egypt, and starting that year, China) reached a record spike in 1982, but an obstacle remained to any potential U.S.-Iraqi relationship - Abu Nidal continued to operate with official support in Baghdad. When the group was expelled to Syria in November 1983, the Reagan administration sent Donald Rumsfeld as a special envoy to cultivate ties.

US military aid to Iraq

Because of fears that revolutionary Iran would defeat Iraq and export its Islamic Revolution to other Middle Eastern nations, the U.S. began giving aid to Iraq. From 1983 to 1990, the U.S. government approved around $200 million in arms sales to Iraq, according to the Stockholm International Peace Institute (SIPRI). These sales amounted to less than 1% of the total arms sold to Iraq in the relevant period, though the US also sold helicopters which, although designated for civilian use, were immediately deployed by Iraq in its war with Iran.

An investigation by the Senate Banking Committee in 1994 determined that the U.S. Department of Commerce had approved, for the purpose of research, the shipping of dual-use biological agents to Iraq during the mid-1980s, including Bacillus anthracis (anthrax), later identified by the Pentagon as a key component of the Iraqi biological warfare program, as well as Clostridium botulinum, Histoplasma capsulatum, Brucella melitensis, and Clostridium perfringens. The Committee report noted that each of these had been "considered by various nations for use in war." Declassified U.S. government documents indicate that the U.S. government had confirmed that Iraq was using chemical weapons (but not biological weapons that the agents being exported could have been used for) "almost daily" during the Iran-Iraq conflict as early as 1983. The chairman of the Senate committee, Don Riegle, said: “The executive branch of our government approved 771 different export licenses for sale of dual-use technology to Iraq. I think it’s a devastating record”.

The level of US covert aid to Iraq during this period is difficult to quantify. Saddam is widely known to have received battlefield “intelligence” from the US. This, corresponding with other facts, leaks and rumors, is seen by many as an indicator of substantial CIA involvement during the era. This remains unproven however.

US economic aid to Iraq

Chiefly, the U.S. government provided Iraq with economic aid. Iraq’s war with Iran, and the consequent disruption in its oil export business, had caused the country to enter a deep debt. U.S. government economic assistance allowed Hussein to continue using resources for the war which otherwise would have to have been diverted. Between 1983 and 1990, Iraq received $5 billion in export credit guarantees from the Commodity Credit Corporation program run by the Department of Agriculture, beginning at $400 million per year in 1983 and increasing to over $1 billion per year in 1988 and 1989, finally coming to an end after another $500 million was granted in 1990. Besides agricultural credits, the U.S. also provided Hussein with other loans. In 1985 the U.S. Export-Import Bank extended more than $684 million in credits to Iraq to build an oil pipeline through Jordan with the construction being undertaken by Californian construction firm Bechtel Corporation.Cite error: A <ref> tag is missing the closing </ref> (see the help page).

Cooling of relations

Following the war, however, there were moves within the Congress of the United States to isolate Iraq diplomatically and economically over concerns about human rights violations, its dramatic military build-up, and hostility to Israel. Specifically, in 1988 the Senate passed the “Prevention of Genocide Act of 1988,” which imposed sanctions on Iraq. The bill was not, however, adopted by the House. These moves were disowned by some Congressmen though some U.S. officials, such as Reagan's head of Policy Planning Staff at the State Department and Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs Paul Wolfowitz disagreed with giving support to the Iraqi regime.

The relationship between Iraq and the United States remained unhindered until the day Iraq invaded Kuwait. On October 2, 1989, President George H.W. Bush signed secret National Security Directive 26, which begins, “Access to Persian Gulf oil and the security of key friendly states in the area are vital to U.S. national security.”

With respect to Iraq, the directive stated, "Normal relations between the United States and Iraq would serve our longer term interests and promote stability in both the Persian Gulf and the Middle East."

Eve of the invasion

In late July, 1990, as negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait stalled, Iraq massed troops on Kuwait’s borders and summoned American Ambassador April Glaspie for an unanticipated meeting with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Two transcripts of that meeting have been produced, both of them controversial. According to the transcripts, Saddam outlined his grievances against Kuwait, while promising that he would not invade Kuwait before one more round of negotiations. In the version published by The New York Times on September 23, 1990, Glaspie expressed concern over the troop buildup, but went on to say:

We have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait. I was in the American Embassy in Kuwait during the late ’60s. The instruction we had during this period was that we should express no opinion on this issue and that the issue is not associated with America. James Baker has directed our official spokesmen to emphasize this instruction. We hope you can solve this problem using any suitable methods via Klibi or via President Mubarak. All that we hope is that these issues are solved quickly.

Some have interpreted these statements as diplomatic language signaling an American "green light" for the invasion. Although the State Department did not confirm (or deny) the authenticity of these transcripts, U.S. sources say that it had handled everything “by the book” (in accordance with the U.S.’s official neutrality on the Iraq-Kuwait issue) and had not signaled Iraqi President Saddam Hussein any approval for defying the Arab League’s Jeddah crisis squad, which had conducted the negotiations. Many believe that Saddam’s expectations may have been influenced by a perception that the US was not interested in the issue, for which the Glaspie transcript is merely an example and that he may have felt so in part because of U.S. support for the reunification of Germany, another act that he considered to be nothing more than the nullification of an artificial, internal border. Others, such as Kenneth Pollack, believe he had no such illusion, or that he simply underestimated the extent of American military response.

In November 1989, CIA director William Webster met with the Kuwaiti head of security, Brigadier Fahd Ahmed Al-Fahd. Subsequent to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, Iraq claimed to have found a memorandum pertaining to their conversation. The Washington Post reported that Kuwait’s foreign minister fainted when confronted with this document at an Arab summit in August. Later, Iraq cited this memorandum as evidence of a CIA - Kuwaiti plot to destabilize Iraq economically and politically. The CIA and Kuwait have described the meeting as routine and the memorandum as a forgery. The purported document reads in part:

We agreed with the American side that it was important to take advantage of the deteriorating economic situation in Iraq in order to put pressure on that country's government to delineate our common border. The Central Intelligence Agency gave us its view of appropriate means of pressure, saying that broad cooperation should be initiated between us on condition that such activities be coordinated at a high level.

Critics of the CIA/Kuwait theory of this document being a forgery point out that if it were so, it would probably have had a more definitive plan described in it. The ambiguous phrasing and the flexible implications, they claim, points more towards a policy position that would be implied in a genuine memorandum.

Diplomacy/Operation Desert Shield

UN Resolution

Within hours of the invasion, Kuwaiti and US delegations requested a meeting of the UN Security Council, which passed Resolution 660, condemning the invasion and demanding a withdrawal of Iraqi troops. On August 3, the Arab League passed its own resolution demanding a withdrawal. The resolution also called for a solution to the conflict from within the League, and warned against foreign intervention. On August 6, the Security Council passed Resolution 661, placing economic sanctions on Iraq.

Possibility of attack on Saudi Arabia

The decision by the West to repel the Iraqi invasion had as much to do with preventing an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia, a nation of far more importance to the world than Kuwait, as it did with Kuwait itself. The rapid success of the Iraqi army against Kuwait had brought Iraq’s army within easy striking distance of the Hama oil fields, Saudi Arabia’s most valuable resources. Iraqi control of these fields as well as Kuwait and Iraqi reserves would have given it a large share of the world’s oil supply, second only to Saudi Arabia itself. The United States, Europe, and Japan saw such a potential monopoly as dangerous. Saudi Arabia, a geographically large nation with dispersed population centers would have found it difficult to quickly mobilize to meet the Iraqi division deployed in Southern Kuwait. Very likely Iraq would have gained control of the Eastern oil fields but it is heavily debatable whether Iraq could have fought into the Saudi capital of Riyadh. The Iraqi armored divisions would face the same difficulties that Saudi forces were facing in order to defend the oil fields, namely to transverse large distances across inhospitable desert. This would have all occurred against the backdrop of intense bombing by the Saudi Air Force, by far the most modern arm of the Saudi military.

Iraq had a number of grievances with Saudi Arabia. The concern over debts stemming from the Iran-Iraq war was even greater when applied to Saudi Arabia, which Iraq owed some 26 billion dollars. The long desert border was also ill-defined. Soon after his victory over Kuwait, Saddam began verbally attacking the Saudi kingdom. He argued that the American-supported country was an illegitimate guardian of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Saddam combined the language of the Islamist groups that had recently fought in Afghanistan with the rhetoric Iran had long used to attack the Saudis.

The addition of “Allahu Akbar” (“God is Great”) to the flag of Iraq and images of Saddam praying in Kuwait were seen as part of a plan to win the support of the Muslim Brotherhood and detach Islamist Mujahideen from Saudi Arabia. There was further escalation of such propaganda attacks on Saudi Arabia as western troops poured into the country.

Operation Desert Shield

President George H. W. Bush quickly announced that the U.S. would launch a "wholly defensive" mission to prevent Iraq from invading Saudi Arabia - Operation Desert Shield - and US troops moved into Saudi Arabia on August 7 1990. On August 8, Iraq declared parts of Kuwait to be extensions of the Iraqi province of Basra and the rest to be the 19th province of Iraq.

The United States Navy mobilized two naval battle groups, the aircraft carriers USS Dwight D. Eisenhower and USS Independence and their escorts, to the area, where they were ready by August 8. 48 US Air Force F-15s from the 1st Fighter Wing at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, landed in Saudia Arabia and immediately commenced round the clock air patrols of the Saudi-Kuwait-Iraq border areas to prevent further Iraqi advances. The U.S. also sent the battleships USS Missouri and USS Wisconsin to the region, and they would later become the last battleships to actively participate in a war. Military buildup continued from there, eventually reaching 500,000 troops. Much of the material was airlifted or carried to the staging areas via fast sealift ships, allowing a quick buildup. The consensus among military analysts is nonetheless that until October, the American military forces in the area would have been insufficient to stop an invasion of Saudi Arabia had Iraq attempted one.

Building a coalition

A long series of UN Security Council and Arab League resolutions were passed regarding the conflict. One of the most important was Resolution 678, passed on November 29, giving Iraq a withdrawal deadline of January 15 1991, and authorizing “all necessary means to uphold and implement Resolution 660,” a diplomatic formulation authorizing the use of force.

The United States, especially Secretary of State James Baker, assembled a coalition of forces to join it in opposing Iraq, consisting of forces from 34 countries: Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Honduras, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Korea, Spain, Syria, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States itself. US troops represented 74% of the coalition’s 660,000 troops in Iraq. Many of the coalition forces were reluctant to join; some felt that the war was an internal Arab affair, or feared increasing American influence in Kuwait. In the end, many nations were persuaded by Iraq’s belligerence towards other Arab states, and offers of economic aid or debt forgiveness.

Justifying the war

The United States gave several public justifications for involvement in the conflict. The first reason given was the importance of the United States' longstanding friendly relationship with Saudi Arabia. During a speech given on September 11th, 1990 George H.W. Bush made the following remarks: "Within 3 days, 120,000 Iraqi troops with 850 tanks had poured into Kuwait and moved south to threaten Saudi Arabia. It was then that I decided to act to check that aggression." Satellite photos showing a build up of Iraqi forces along the border were the supposed source of this information. Jean Heller, an investigative reporter on the St Petersburg Times decided to investigate. Satellite photos from a commercial satellite - Soyuz Karta were obtained for around US$ 3,000. On Januray 6, 1991 she wrote an article detailing what had been found, titled "Photos Don't Show Buildup." The photos were reviewed by several experts and did not show any evidence to support the claims of George H.W. Bush. No buildup of troops in anywhere near the amounts stated by the President were visible in the photos.

Despite the fact that the story by Jean Heller never made it into mainstream press, some Americans were dissatisfied with the explanations and “No Blood For Oil” became a rallying cry for domestic opponents of the war, though they never reached the size of opposition to the Vietnam War. Later justifications for the war included Iraq’s history of human rights abuses under President Saddam Hussein, the potential that Iraq may develop nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction and that “naked aggression will not stand.”

Although the human rights abuses of the Iraq regime before and after the Kuwait invasion were well-documented, the government of Kuwait set out to influence American opinion with a few accounts. Shortly after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the organization Citizens for a Free Kuwait was formed in the U.S. It hired the public relations firm Hill and Knowlton for about $11 million, paid by the Kuwaiti government. This firm went on to manufacture a campaign in which a nurse working in the Kuwait City hospital described Iraqi soldiers pulling babies out of incubators and letting them die on the floor. The story was an influence in tipping both the public and Congress towards a war with Iraq: six Congressmen said the testimony was enough for them to support military action against Iraq and seven Senators referenced the testimony in debate. The Senate supported the military actions in a 52-47 vote. One year later, however, this allegation was labeled a fabricated hoax. The woman who had testified was found to be a member of the Kuwaiti Royal Family living in Paris during the war, and therefore could not have been present during the alleged crime. (See Nurse Nayirah.)

Final peace proposals

Various peace proposals were floated, but none were agreed to. The United States insisted that the only acceptable terms for peace were Iraq's full, unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. Iraq insisted that withdrawal from Kuwait must be “linked” to a simultaneous withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon and Israeli troops from the West Bank, Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and southern Lebanon. Morocco and Jordan were persuaded by this proposal, but Syria, Israel, and the anti-Iraq coalition denied that there was any connection to the Kuwait issue. Syria joined the coalition to expel Saddam but Israel remained officially neutral despite rocket attacks on Israeli civilians. The Bush administration persuaded Israel to remain outside the conflict with promises of increased aid, while the PLO under Yasser Arafat openly supported Saddam Hussein, leading to a later rupture in Palestinian-Kuwaiti ties and the expulsion of many Palestinians from Kuwait.

On January 12, 1991 the United States Congress authorized the use of military force to drive Iraq out of Kuwait. The votes were 52-47 in the Senate and 250-183 in the House. These were the closest margins in authorizing force by the Congress since the War of 1812. Soon after the other states in the coalition also authorized force.

Air campaign

Main air campaign starts

A day after the deadline set in Resolution, the coalition launched a massive air campaign codenamed Operation Desert Storm with more than 1,000 sorties launching per day, beginning early morning on January 17, 1991. Five hours after the first attacks, Baghdad state radio broadcast a voice identified as Saddam Hussein declaring that “The great duel, the mother of all battles has begun. The dawn of victory nears as this great showdown begins.”

The Persian Gulf War is sometimes called the “computer war” because of the advanced weapons used in the air campaign which included precision-guided munitions (or “smart bombs”), cluster munitions, BLU-82 “Daisy Cutters”, and cruise missiles. Iraq responded by launching 8 Scud missiles into Israel the next day. The first priority for Coalition forces was destruction of the Iraqi air force and anti-aircraft facilities. This was quickly achieved, and for the duration of the war, Coalition aircraft could operate largely unchallenged. Despite Iraq’s better-than-expected anti-aircraft capabilities, only one coalition aircraft was lost in the opening day of the war. F-117A stealth planes were heavily used in this phase to elude Iraq’s extensive SAM systems and anti-aircraft weapons; once these were destroyed, other types of aircraft could more safely be used. The sorties were launched mostly from Saudi Arabia and the six Coalition aircraft carrier groups in the Persian Gulf.

The next coalition targets were command and communication facilities. Saddam had closely micromanaged the Iraqi forces in the Iran-Iraq War and initiative at the lower levels was discouraged. Coalition planners hoped Iraqi resistance would quickly collapse if deprived of command and control.

Iraq's airforce escapes to Iran

The first week of the air war saw a few Iraqi sorties, but these did little damage and thirty-eight Iraqi MiGs were shot down by Coalition planes. Soon after, the Iraqi Air Force began fleeing to Iran, with between 115 to 140 aircraft flown to Iran. The mass exodus of Iraqi aircraft to Iran took coalition forces by surprise and they were unable to react before most of the Iraqi aircraft had made it "safely" to Iranian airbases. Iran has never returned the aircraft to Iraq and did not release the aircrews to return home until years later. On January 23, Iraq was accused of dumping approximately 1 million tons of crude oil into the gulf, causing the largest oil spill in history. This was denied by the Iraqi government who claimed that the allied bombing campaign had damaged and destroyed Iraqi oil tankers that were docked at the time.

Infrastructure bombing

The third and largest phase of the air campaign targeted military targets throughout Iraq and Kuwait: Scud missile launchers, weapons of mass destruction sites, weapons research facilities and naval forces. About one-third of the Coalition airpower was devoted to attacking Scuds, which were on trucks and therefore difficult to locate. In addition, it targeted facilities useful for both the military and civilians: electricity production facilities, nuclear reactors, telecommunications equipment, port facilities, oil refineries and distribution, railroads and bridges. Electrical power facilities were destroyed across the country. At the end of the war, electricity production was at four percent of its pre-war levels. Bombs destroyed the utility of all major dams, most major pumping stations and many sewage treatment plants. Some U.S. and British special forces teams had been covertly inserted into western Iraq to aid in the search and destruction of Scuds. However, the lack of adequate terrain for concealment hindered their operations, and many of them were killed or captured.

Hits on civillian facilities

In most cases, the Allies avoided hitting civilian-only facilities. However, on February 13 1991, two laser-guided "smart bombs" destroyed the Amiriyah blockhouse, which the Iraqis claimed was for the auspices of an air shelter. U.S. officials claimed that the blockhouse was a military communications center, but Western reporters have been unable to find evidence for this. The White House claims, in a report titled Apparatus of Lies: Crafting Tragedy, that U.S. intelligence sources reported the blockhouse was being used for military command purposes. In his book, Saddam's Bombmaker, the former director of Iraq’s nuclear weapon program, who defected to the west, supports the theory that the facility was used for both purposes.

We sought refuge several times at the shelter…. But it was always filled…. The shelter had television sets, drinking fountains, its own electrical generator, and looked sturdy enough to withstand a hit from conventional weapons. But I stopped trying to get in one night after noticing some long black limousines slithering in and out of an underground gate in the back. I asked around and was told that it was a command center. After considering it more closely, I decided it was probably Saddam’s own operational base.

Iraq launches missile strikes

Iraq launched missile attacks on coalition bases in Saudi Arabia and on Israel, in the hopes of drawing Israel into the war and drawing other Arab states out of it. This strategy proved ineffective. Israel did not join the coalition, and all Arab states stayed in the coalition except Jordan, which remained officially neutral throughout. The Scud missiles generally caused fairly light damage, although its potency was felt on February 25 when 28 Americans were killed when a Scud destroyed their barracks in Dhahran. The Scuds targeting Israel were ineffective due to the fact that increasing the range of the Scud resulted in the dramatic reduction in accuracy and payload.

Vulnerability of Iraq against air power

On January 29, Iraq attacked and occupied the lightly-defended Saudi city of Khafji with tanks and infantry. However, the Battle of Khafji ended when Iraqis were driven back by Saudi forces supported by U.S. Marines with close air support over the following two days. Khafji was a strategic city immediately after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The Iraqi reluctance to commit several armoured divisions to the occupation and subsequent use of Khafji as a launching pad into the initially lightly defended Eastern portion of Saudi Arabia is considered by many academics as a grave strategic error. Not only would Iraq have secured a majority of Middle Eastern oil supplies, it would have found itself better able to threaten the subsequent U.S. deployment along superior defensive lines.

The effect of the air campaign was to decimate entire Iraqi brigades deployed in the open desert in combat formation. The air campaign also prevented effective Iraqi resupply to forward deployed units engaged in combat, as well preventing the large number (450,000) of Iraqi troops from achieving the force concentration essential to victory.

The air campaign had a significant effect on the tactics employed by opposing forces in subsequent conflicts. No longer were entire divisions dug in the open facing U.S. forces but rather they were dispersed, like had been done to the Serbian forces in Kosovo. Opposing forces also reduced the length of their supply lines and the total area defended. This was seen during the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan when the Taliban preemptively abandoned large swaths of land and retreated into their strongholds. This increased their force concentration and reduced long vulnerable supply lines. This tactic was also observed in the invasion of Iraq when the Iraqi forces retreated from northern Iraqi Kurdistan into the cities.

Ground campaign

The coalition forces dominated the air with their technological advantages, but the ground forces were considered to be more evenly matched up between Iraqis and coalition infantry. It turned out not to be much of a fight though.

Initial moves into Iraq

Elements of the 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division performed a covert recon into Iraq on 9 February 1991, followed by a recon in force on February 20 that destroyed an Iraqi battalion. On February 22, 1991, Iraq agreed to a Soviet-proposed cease-fire agreement. The agreement called for Iraq to withdraw troops to pre-invasion positions within three weeks following a total cease-fire, and called for monitoring of the cease-fire and withdrawal to be overseen by the UN Security Council. The US rejected the proposal but said that retreating Iraqi forces would not be attacked, and gave twenty-four hours for Iraq to begin withdrawing forces.

On February 24, the U.S.-led forces began Operation Desert Sabre, the ground campaign. Soon, U.S. Marines and their Arab allies penetrated into Kuwait, collecting thousands of deserting Iraqi troops, weakened and demoralized by the extensive air campaign. Some Iraqi units maintained limited organization and attempted to launch counterattacks, but proved ineffective. A few days into the campaign, Kuwait City was recaptured by units of the Kuwaiti Army.

Allied artillery rained down on Iraqi positions, covering the ground advance. The U.S. 3rd Armored Division were deployed; their coventional artillery and Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, proved lethally effective.

Coalition forces enter Iraq

Shortly afterwards, the U.S. VII Corps assembled in full strength and launched an armoured attack into Iraq, just to the west of Kuwait, taking Iraqi forces by surprise. Simultaneously, the U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps launched a sweeping “left-hook” attack across the largely undefended desert of southern Iraq, led by the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (3rd ACR) and the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized). The left flank of this movement was protected by the French 6th Light Armored Division (which included units of the French Foreign Legion). The fast-moving French force quickly overcame the Iraqi 45th Infantry Division, suffering only a handful of casualties, and took up blocking positions to prevent any Iraqi force from attacking the Allied flank. The right flank of the movement was protected by the British 1st Armoured Division. Once the allies had penetrated deep into Iraqi territory, they turned eastward, launching a flank attack against the Republican Guard.

Both sides exchanged fire, but the Republican guard divisions, had been worn down by weeks of aerial bombardment and proved unable to withstand the Allied advance. Tank battles, including the Battle of Medina Ridge and the Battle of 73 Easting, flared as the Republican Guard attempted to retreat, which the Allies won with minimal losses.

Iraq's forces outmatched

It soon became obvious the Iraqi strategy was inherently flawed. Once Iraq had decided it was not going to advance into the eastern oil fields of Saudi Arabia, there was no reason for Iraqi forces to deploy further south from Kuwait City in great numbers. The decision to deploy significant quantities of troops along the desert border of Kuwait unnecessarily increased the length of Iraqi supply lines. Secondly, once the decision had been made to deploy along the border, the decision to extend it only slightly along the Iraqi border invited a massive flanking. Indeed the Iraqis did not possess enough forces to maintain a long enough front along the border of Kuwait and southwestern Iraq. Therefore it was imperative that the deployment and the front should have been shortened to just South of Kuwait City and extending to the outskirts of Basra. Iraq possessed only one absolute military advantage over the allies, that being the quality and quantity of its artillery pieces. However, most of Iraq’s artillery pieces were towed and hence not well suited to large expansive maneuvers. This also meant that it was in Iraq’s interest to slow down the movement of opposition forces and engage along lines that could not be easily broken or flanked.

The Coalition advance was much swifter than U.S. generals expected. On February 26, Iraqi troops began retreating out of Kuwait, alledgedly setting fire to Kuwaiti oil fields as they left (although the fact that allied troops had to clear unexploded cluster bombs from the oil fields before the fires could be extinguished has lead some observers to suggest that the fires may have been caused by the allied bombing campaign). A long convoy of retreating Iraqi troops formed along the main Iraq-Kuwait highway. The column also had prisoners and other fleeing Iraqi civilians such as families of Iraqi military. Controversially, this convoy was bombed so extensively by the Allies that it came to be known as the Highway of Death. Equally controversially, forces from the United States, the United Kingdom, and France continued to pursue retreating Iraqi forces over the border and back into Iraq, moving to within 150 miles of Baghdad before withdrawing.

One hundred hours after the ground campaign started, President Bush declared a cease-fire and on February 27 declared that Kuwait had been liberated.

Post-war military analysis

Although it was said at the time that Iraqi troops numbered approximately 545,000 (even 600,000) today most experts think that both the qualitative and quantitative descriptions of the Iraqi Army at the time were exaggerated, as they included both temporary and auxiliary support elements. Many of the Iraqi troops were also young, under-resourced and poorly trained conscripts. Both the Coalition and the Iraqi leadership had an interest in exaggerating the numbers and strength of the Iraqi forces.

The Coalition committed approximately 540,000 troops. In addition to these, a further 100,000 Turkish troops were deployed along the common border of Turkey and Iraq. This caused significant force dilution of the Iraqi military by forcing it to deploy its forces along all its borders (except, ironically, its bitter enemy Iran). This allowed the main thrust by the Americans to not only possess a significant technological advantage but also a superiority in force numbers.

The main surprise of the ground campaign was the incredible success of Allied technology over the mainly Soviet equipped and styled Iraqi army. This was due to the Iraqis failing to find an effective countermeasure to the thermal sights and the sabot rounds used by the M1 Abrams and the other Coalition tanks. This equipment enabled Coalition tanks to effectively engage and destroy Iraqi tanks from more than three times the distance that Iraqi tanks could engage. The Iraqi forces also failed to utilize the advantage that could be gained from using urban warfare—fighting within Kuwait City—which could have inflicted significant casualties on the attacking forces. Urban combat reduces the range at which fighting occurs and can negate some of the technological advantage that well equipped forces enjoy.

The end of active hostilities

A peace conference was held in Iraqi territory occupied by the coalition. At the conference, Iraq won the approval of the use of armed helicopters on their side of the temporary border, ostensibly for government transit due to the damage done to civilian transportation. Soon after, these helicopters, and much of the Iraqi armed forces, were refocused toward fighting against a Shiite uprising in the south. In the North, Kurdish leaders took heart in American statements that they would support an uprising and began fighting, in the hopes of triggering a coup. However, when no American support was forthcoming, Iraqi generals remained loyal and brutally crushed the Kurdish troops. Millions of Kurds fled across the mountains to Kurdish areas of Turkey and Iran. These incidents would later result in no-fly zones being established in both the North and the South of Iraq. In Kuwait, the Emir was restored and suspected Iraqi collaborators were repressed. Eventually, over 400,000 people were expelled from the country, including a large number of Palestinians (due to their support of and collaboration with Saddam Hussein).

There was some criticism of the Bush administration for its decision to allow Saddam Hussein to remain in power, rather than pushing on to capture Baghdad and overthrowing his government. In their co-written 1998 book, A World Transformed, Bush and Brent Scowcroft arguing that such a course would have fractured the alliance and would have had many unnecessary political and human costs associated with it.

In 1992, the United States Secretary of Defense during the war, Dick Cheney, made the same point:

I would guess if we had gone in there, I would still have forces in Baghdad today. We'd be running the country. We would not have been able to get everybody out and bring everybody home.

And the final point that I think needs to be made is this question of casualties. I don't think you could have done all of that without significant additional U.S. casualties, and while everybody was tremendously impressed with the low cost of the (1991) conflict, for the 146 Americans who were killed in action and for their families, it wasn't a cheap war.

And the question in my mind is, how many additional American casualties is Saddam (Hussein) worth? And the answer is, not that damned many. So, I think we got it right, both when we decided to expel him from Kuwait, but also when the President made the decision that we'd achieved our objectives and we were not going to go get bogged down in the problems of trying to take over and govern Iraq.

Instead of greater involvement of its own military, the United States hoped that Saddam would be overthrown in an internal coup. The Central Intelligence Agency used its assets in Iraq to organize a revolt, but the Iraqi government defeated the effort.

On March 10, 1991, Operation Desert Storm began to move 540,000 American troops out of the Persian Gulf.

Coalition involvement

Members of the Coalition included Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Greece, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Korea, Spain, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and the United States of America. Germany and Japan provided financial assistance and donated military hardware instead of direct military assistance. America asked Israel not to participate in the war despite air strikes on Israeli citizens. India extended military support to the United States in the form of refueling facilities situated in the Arabian Sea.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom was numerically the largest European nation to partake in combat operations during the war. Operation Granby was the name for the operations in the Gulf. British Army regiments, Royal Navy vessels, and Royal Air Force squadrons were mobilized to the Gulf. The Royal Air Force using various aircraft operated from airbases in Saudi Arabia. Almost 2,500 armoured vehicles were shipped for action.

Chief Royal Navy vessels deployed to the gulf included a number of Broadsword-class frigates, and Sheffield-class destroyers, other RN and RFA ships were also deployed. The light aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal was not deployed to the Gulf area, but was deployed to the Mediterranean Sea.

Canada

Canada was one of the first nations to agree to condemn Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and it quickly agreed to join the U.S.-led coalition. In August 1990, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney sent the destroyers HMCS Terra Nova and HMCS Athabaskan to enforce the trade blockade against Iraq. The supply ship HMCS Protecteur was also sent to aid the gathering coalition forces.

After the UN authorized full use of force in the operation Canada sent a CF18 squadron with support personnel. Canada also sent a field hospital to deal with casualties from the ground war. When the air war began, Canada's planes were integrated into the coalition force and provided air cover and attacked ground targets. This was the first time since the Korean War that Canadian forces had participated in offensive combat operations.

Troop deployment

• United States: 550,000 troops
• Saudi Arabia: 52,000 troops (only 20-40,000 took part in the liberation of Kuwait)
• Turkey: 50,000 troops (did not take part in any battle)
• United Kingdom: 43,000 troops Operation Granby
• Egypt: 35,000 troops
• United Arab Emirates: 1,000 troops
• Oman: 950 troops
• France: 14,663 troops Opération Daguet
• Syria: 16,000 troops
• Kuwait: 7,000 troops
• Bangladesh: 2,000 troops
• Pakistan: 5,500 troops
• Canada: 4,500 troops Operation FRICTION
• Niger: 500 troops
• Bahrain: 200 troops
• Morocco: 2,000 troops
• Netherlands: 200 troops
• Honduras: 150 troops

Casualties

Coalition deaths

Gulf War casualty numbers are controversial. Coalition military deaths have been reported to be around 378, but the DoD reports that US forces suffered 147 battle-related and 235 non-battle-related deaths, plus one F/A-18 Hornet Navy pilot listed as MIA. The UK suffered 47 deaths, the Arab countries lost 39 men (18 Saudis, 10 Egyptians, 6 from the UAE, 3 Syrians, and 1 Kuwaiti), and France lost 2 men. The largest single loss of Coalition forces happened on February 25, 1991, when an Iraqi Al-Huseyn missile hit an American military barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia killing 28 U.S. Army Reservists from Pennsylvania.

Coalition wounded

The number of coalition wounded in combat seems to have been less than 1,000. However, as of the year 2000, 183,000 U.S. veterans of the Gulf War, more than a quarter of the U.S. troops who participated in the War, have been declared permanently disabled by the Department of Veterans Affairs . About 30% of the 700,000 men and women who served in U.S. forces in the Gulf War still suffer an array of serious symptoms whose causes are not fully understood .

Pre-war estimates

Before the war Pentagon officials were estimating 30,000-40,000 coalition casualties. The Dupuy Institute stood alone and in front of Congress predicted Coalition Casualties below 6,000. They used the TNDM model which makes use of historical data from previous wars to predict casualties. While the Institute was phenomenally accurate, it was because the Iraqi armed forces fought in the open desert with tanks placed behind sand berms. Had the Iraqi military made use of urban warfare in Kuwait City and dug their tanks in within the city perimeters instead of behind sand berms the actual figures may have been different. The TNDM model makes use of 'human' factors such as morale and they predicted that very few Iraqi divisions would put up resistance. This is a value judgment that is difficult to make accurately before war. The 120,000 professional Iraqi soldiers backed by 4,500 tanks, 4,000 armored vehicles and 3,000 artillery pieces and with another 280,000 conscripted soldiers armed with RPGs, heavy mortars and heavy machine guns provided a force that could have made the low casualty estimate not inevitable. The United States, on the other hand had 3,400 tanks, 3,700 artillery pieces, 4,000 armored personnel carriers, 2,000 helicopters and about 2,600 aircraft.

The 2003 invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq have aptly demonstrated how casualties can be inflicted by a technologically inferior force which utilizes urban environments for concealment and cover against precise artillery and air strikes. It has demonstrated how urban warfare might have blunted the greatest advantage of the Coalition, long distance killing. 120,000 committed soldiers backed by modern equipment could be expected to cause large casualties on the order of several thousand; the fact that it did not happen in the Gulf War is no guarantee that it will not happen in the future.

Iraqi deaths and wounded

Independent analysts generally agree the Iraqi death toll was well below initial post-war estimates. In the immediate aftermath of the war, these estimates ranged as high as 100,000 Iraqi troops killed and 300,000 wounded. According to "Gulf War Air Power Survey" by Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, (a report commissioned by the U.S. Air Force; 1993-ISBN 0-16-041950-6), there were an estimated 10-12,000 Iraqi combat deaths in the air campaign and as many as 10,000 casualties in the ground war. This analysis is based on enemy prisoner of war reports. The Iraqi government claimed that 2,300 civilians died during the air campaign, most of them during an F-117 Stealth Fighter strike on what was believed to be an Iraqi military communications center in Baghdad (it turned out to be an air raid shelter also).

One infamous incident during the war highlighted the question of large-scale Iraqi combat deaths. This was the “bulldozer assault”, wherein two brigades from the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) used anti-mine plows mounted on tanks and combat earthmovers to bury Iraqi soldiers defending the fortified "Saddam Line." While approximately 2,000 of the troops surrendered, escaping burial, one newspaper story reported that the U.S. commanders estimated thousands of Iraqi soldiers had been buried alive during the two-day assault February 24-25, 1991. However, like all other troop estimates made during the war, the estimated 8,000 Iraqi defenders was probably greatly inflated. While one commander, Col. Anthony Moreno of the 2nd Brigade, thought the numbers might have been in the thousands, another reported his brigade buried between 80 and 250 Iraqis. After the war, the Iraqi government claimed to have found 44 such bodies.

Controversies surrounding the Gulf War

Civilian deaths

The increased importance of air attacks from both warplanes and cruise missiles led to much controversy over the level of civilian deaths caused during the initial stages of the War.

Within the first 24 hours of the War, more than 1,000 sorties were flown with Baghdad a major target. The city received heavy bombing due to being the seat of power for President Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi forces' command and control. However, this also led to substantial civilian casualties.

Other aerial attacks also led to civilian casualties, and other incidents dubbed 'collateral damage'. In one particularly notable event, stealth bombers attacked a bunker in Amirya, causing the deaths of between 200 and 400 civilians who were taking refuge there at the time. Subsequently, scenes of burned and mutilated bodies were broadcast and controversy raged over the status of the bunker, with some stating that it was a civilian shelter while others contended that it was a centre of Iraqi military operations and the civilians had been deliberately moved there to act as human shields.

Friendly fire

While the death toll among Coalition forces engaging enemy combatants was very low, a substantial number of deaths were caused by accidental attacks from other allied units. Of the 147 American troops who died in battle, 24% were killed by friendly fire, a total of 35 service personnel. A further 11 died in detonations of allied munitions. Nine British service personnel were also killed in a friendly fire incident when a USAF A-10A Thunderbolt-II attacked a group of two Warrior IFV's.

Gulf War illness

Many returning coalition soldiers reported illnesses following their participation in the Gulf War, a phenomenon known as Gulf War illness, and much more often incorrectly called Gulf War syndrome. There has been widespread speculation and disagreement about the causes of the illness and reported birth defects. Some factors considered as possibly causal include exposure to depleted uranium, chemical weapons, anthrax vaccine given to deploying soldiers, and possibly infectious diseases. Major Michael Donnelly, a former USAF officer during the Gulf War, helped publicize the syndrome and advocated for veterans' rights in this regard.

Effects of depleted uranium

Depleted uranium (DU) was used in the Gulf War for the first time on the battlefield, in tank kinetic energy penetrators and 20-30mm cannon ordnance. DU is a heavy metal and chemical toxicant with nephrotoxic (kidney-damaging) and teratogenic (birth defect-causing) properties. Uranium exposure is associated with a variety of illnesses. The chemical toxicological hazard posed by uranium dwarfs its radiological hazard because it is only weakly radioactive, and depleted uranium even less so.

Increases in the rate of birth defects for children born to Gulf War veterans have been reported. A 2001 survey of 15,000 U.S. Gulf War combat veterans and 15,000 control veterans found that the Gulf War veterans were 1.8 (fathers) to 2.8 (mothers) times as likely to report having children with birth defects. A study of UK veterans who thought they might have been exposed to DU showed aberrations in their white blood cell chromosomes. In early 2004, the UK Pensions Appeal Tribunal Service attributed birth defect claims from a Gulf War combat veteran to depleted uranium poisoning. Uranyl ion contamination has been found on and around depleted uranium targets. DU has recently been recognized as a neurotoxin.

In 1998, Iraqi government doctors reported that Coalition use of depleted uranium caused a massive increase in birth defects and cancer among Iraqis, particularly leukemia. The government doctors claimed they were unable to provide evidence linking depleted uranium to the cancer and birth defects because the sanctions prevented them from obtaining necessary testing equipment. Subsequently, a World Health Organization team visited Basra and proposed a study to investigate the causes of higher cancer rates in southern Iraq, but Saddam refused.

The World Health Organization assessed the health risks of depleted uranium in a post-combat environment thanks to a 2001 mission to Kosovo. A 2001 WHO fact sheet on depleted uranium concludes: "because DU is only weakly radioactive, very large amounts of dust (on the order of grams) would have to be inhaled for the additional risk of lung cancer to be detectable in an exposed group. Risks for other radiation-induced cancers, including leukaemia, are considered to be very much lower than for lung cancer." In addition, "no reproductive or developmental effects have been reported in humans" as a result of DU exposure. But the WHO also issues many warnings about DU, "If DU dust inhalation resulted in the incorporation of significant amounts of insoluble uranium compounds, long term patient follow-ups should include checks for lung tumours." The WHO also advises preventing access to DU affected sites until it is cleaned up or stabilized. The UN has similar recommendations, as does the US military

The U.S. Department of State has also published a fact sheet on depleted uranium. It states: "World Health Organization and other scientific research studies indicate depleted uranium poses no serious health risks" and "depleted uranium does not cause birth defects. Iraqi military use of chemical and nerve agents in the 1980s and 1990s is the likely cause of alleged birth defects among Iraqi children." In regard to cancer claims, the fact sheet states that "according to environmental health experts, it is medically impossible to contract leukemia as a result of exposure to uranium or depleted uranium," and "cancer rates in almost 19,000 highly exposed uranium industry workers who worked at Oak Ridge National Laboratory projects between 1943 and 1947 have been examined, and no excess cancers were observed through 1974. Other epidemiological studies of lung cancer in uranium mill and metal processing plant workers have found either no excess cancers or attributed them to known carcinogens other than uranium, such as radon." However, how this relates to insoluble DU oxide particulates deposited in lungs has not been demonstrated. For instance, there are no known lab studies conducted on animals to determine long term radiological effects of varying levels of DU oxide dust in lungs, and no known field studies comparing known, high, airborne exposure levels with a control group. All studies to date have been based on applied radiological theory, and epidemiological surveys subject to higher variances and unknowns than lab studies.

Some claim that the health risk of DU oxide is higher because depleted uranium ammunition vaporizes into tiny particles when it hits a hard target. In fact, most recently a comprehensive study by The Royal Society, a fellowship of over 1400 distinguished scientists, researchers and professors, found that depleted uranium might pose kidney and lungs risks for small numbers (those most highly exposed) of civilians as well as soldiers.

The 'Highway of Death'

On the night of February 26-27, 1991, defeated Iraqi forces began leaving Kuwait on the main highway north of Al Jahra in a column of some 1400 vehicles, some military and some civilian and commandeered from the Kuwaiti population. United States air forces pursued and destroyed the convoy, subjecting it to sustained bombing for several hours in a measure which some held to be disproportionate and a war crime.

Crossing Iraqi borders

Having driven Iraqi forces over the border from Kuwait, some coalition troops stood down, but forces from the USA, UK and France continued to pursue the retreating remnants of the Iraq forces across into Iraqi territory. Disagreements arose over whether the UN mandate to eject Saddam Hussein's forces from Kuwait allowed the coalition to enter Iraqi sovereign territory or not, with some military officials arguing that it was necessary to prevent them from regrouping and attempting a counter-attack.

Cost

The cost of the war to the United States was calculated by Congress to be $61.1 billion. Other sources estimate up to $71 billion. About $53 billion of that amount was paid by different countries around the world: $36 billion by Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States; $16 billion by Germany and Japan (which sent no combat forces due to terms contained in the treaty that ended World War II). About 25% of Saudi Arabia's contribution was paid in the form of in-kind services to the troops, such as food and transportation.

U.S. troops represented about 74% of the combined force, and the global cost was therefore higher. The United Kingdom, for instance, spent $4.1 billion during this war.

Media

The Gulf War was a heavily televised war. For the first time people all over the world were able to watch live pictures of missiles hitting their targets and fighters taking off from aircraft carriers. Allied forces were keen to demonstrate the accuracy of their weapons.

In the United States, the "big three" network anchors led the network news coverage of the war: ABC's Peter Jennings, CBS's Dan Rather, and NBC's Tom Brokaw were anchoring their evening newscasts when air strikes began on January 16, 1991. ABC News correspondent Gary Shepard, reporting live from Baghdad, told Jennings of the quietness of the city. But, moments later, Shepard was back on the air as flashes of light were seen on the horizon and tracer fire was heard on the ground. On CBS, viewers were watching a report from correspondent Allen Pizzey, who was also reporting from Baghdad, when the war began. Rather, after the report was finished, announced that there were unconfirmed reports of flashes in Baghdad and heavy air traffic at bases in Saudi Arabia. On the "NBC Nightly News", correspondent Mike Boettcher reported unusual air activity in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Moments later, Brokaw announced to his viewers that the air attack had begun. But it was CNN who gained the most popularity for their coverage, and indeed its wartime coverage is often cited as one of the landmark events in the development of the network. CNN correspondents John Holliman and Peter Arnett and CNN anchor Bernard Shaw relayed telephone reports from the Al-Rashid Hotel as the air strikes began. Newspapers all over the world also covered the war and TIME Magazine published a special issue dated January 28, 1991, the headline "WAR IN THE GULF" emblazoned on the cover over a picture of Baghdad taken as the war began.

U.S. policy regarding media freedom was much more restrictive than in the Vietnam War. The policy had been spelled out in a Pentagon document entitled Annex Foxtrot. Most of the press information came from briefings organized by the military. Only selected journalists were allowed to visit the front lines or conduct interviews with soldiers. Those visits were always conducted in the presence of officers, and were subject to both prior approval by the military and censorship afterward. This was ostensibly to protect sensitive information from being revealed to Iraq, but often in practice it was used to protect politically embarrassing information from being revealed. This policy was heavily influenced by the military's experience with the Vietnam War, which it believed it had lost due to public opposition within the United States.

At the same time, the coverage of this war was new in its instantaneousness. Many American journalists remained stationed in the Iraqi capital Baghdad throughout the war, and footage of incoming missiles was carried almost immediately on the nightly television news and the cable news channels such as CNN. A British crew from CBS News (David Green and Andy Thompson), equipped with satellite transmission equipment travelled with the front line forces and, having transmitted live TV pictures of the fighting en route, arrived the day before the forces in Kuwait City, broadcasting live television from the city and covering the entrance of the Arab forces (and other journalists!) the following day.

Consequences

Following uprisings in the north and south, Iraqi no-fly zones were established to help protect the Shi'ite and Kurdish groups in South and North Iraq, respectively. These no-fly zones (originally north of the 36th parallel and south of the 32nd parallel) were monitored mainly by the United States and the United Kingdom, though France also participated. Combined, they flew more sorties over Iraq in the eleven years following the war than were flown during the war. These sorties dropped bombs nearly every other day against surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft guns which engaged the patrolling aircraft. However, the greatest amount of bombs was dropped during two sustained bombing campaigns: Operation Desert Strike, which lasted a few weeks in September 1996, and Operation Desert Fox, in December 1998. Operation Northern Watch, the no-fly zone covering the Kurds, allowed the population to focus on developing security and infrastructure, which was reflected after Saddam's fall in 2003 by a much more progressive and sustainable region (when compared to the rest of the country following Operation Iraqi Freedom). Operation Southern Watch, on the other hand, was not successful in providing the Shi'ite population the same opportunity.

Widespread infrastructure destruction during the ground war hurt the Iraqi population. Years after the war, electricity production was less than a quarter of its pre-war level. The destruction of water treatment facilities caused sewage to flow directly into the Tigris River, from which civilians drew drinking water, resulting in widespread disease. Funds provided by Western nations to help combat the problem were diverted instead to maintaining Saddam's military control over the country.

Economic sanctions were kept in place following the war, pending a weapons inspection with which Iraq never fully cooperated. Iraq was later allowed to import certain products under the UN's Oil for Food program. A 1998 UNICEF report found that the sanctions resulted in an increase to 90,000 deaths per year. Many argue that the sanctions on Iraq and the American military presence in Saudi Arabia contributed to an increasingly negative image of the United States in the Arab world.

A United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) on weapons was established, to monitor Iraq's compliance with restrictions on weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. Iraq accepted some and refused other weapons inspections. The team found some evidence of biological weapons programs at one site and non-compliance at many other sites.

In 1997, Iraq expelled all U.S. members of the inspection team, alleging that the United States was using the inspections as a front for espionage; members of UNSCOM were in regular contact with various intelligence agencies to provide information on weapons sites back and forth. The team returned for an even more turbulent time period between 1997 and 1999; one member of the weapons inspection team, U.S. Marine Scott Ritter, resigned in 1998, alleging that the Clinton administration was blocking investigations because they did not want a full-scale confrontation with Iraq. In 1999, the team was replaced by UNMOVIC, which began inspections in 2002. In 2002, Iraq — and especially Saddam Hussein — became targets in the United States' War on Terrorism, leading to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, led by the United States and, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom.

The People's Republic of China (whose army in many ways resembled the Iraqi army) was surprised at the performance of American technology on the battlefield. The swiftness of the coalition victory resulted in an overall change in Chinese military thinking and began a movement to technologically modernize the People's Liberation Army.

A crucial result of the Gulf War, according to Gilles Kepel, was the sharp revival in Islamic extremism. The change of face by Saddam's secular regime did little to draw support from Islamist groups. However, it, combined with the Saudi Arabian alliance with the United States and Saudi Arabia being seen as being on the same side of Israel dramatically eroded that regime's legitimacy. Activity of Islamist groups against the Saudi regime increased dramatically. The presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia, the invasion of Iraq, and the subsequent blockade were some of the greivances listed by Osama bin Laden in his 1998 Fatwa.

In part to win back favour with Islamist groups Saudi Arabia greatly increased funding to those that would support the regime. Throughout the newly independent states of Central Asia the Saudis paid for the distribution of millions of Qur'ans and the building of hundreds of mosques for extremist groups. In Afghanistan the Saudi regime became a leading patron of the Taliban in that nation's civil war, and one of the few foreign countries to officially recognize the government.

Technology

Precision guided munitions (PGMs, also "smart bombs"), such as the United States Air Force guided missile AGM-130, were heralded as key in allowing military strikes to be made with a minimum of civilian casualties compared to previous wars. Specific buildings in downtown Baghdad could be bombed whilst journalists in their hotels watched cruise missiles fly by. PGMs amounted to approximately 7.4% of all bombs dropped by the coalition. Other bombs included cluster bombs, which break up into clusters of bomblets, and daisy cutters, 15,000-pound bombs which can disintegrate everything within hundreds of yards.

Scud is a tactical ballistic missile that the Soviet Union developed and deployed among the forward deployed Red Army divisions in Eastern Germany. The role of the Scuds which were armed with nuclear and chemical warheads was to destroy Command and Control, Communication Facilities and delay full mobilisation of Western German and Allied Forces in Germany. It could also be used to directly target ground forces. Scud missiles utilise inertial guidance which operates for the duration that the Engines operate. Iraq used Scud missiles, launching them into both Saudi Arabia and Israel. Some bombs caused extensive casualties, others caused little damage. Concerns were raised of possible chemical or biological warheads on these rockets, but if they existed they were not used. Scud missile are not as effective at delivering chemical payloads as is commonly believed because intense heat during the Scud's flight at approximately Mach 5 denatures most of the chemical payload. Chemical weapons are inherently better suited to being delivered by cruise missiles or fighter bombers. The Scud is best suited to delivering tactical nuclear warheads, a role for which it is as capable today as it was when it was first developed.

America's Patriot missile defense was used for the first time in combat. The U.S. military claimed a high effectiveness against Scud at the time, which reassured allied troops and would not have encouraged the operators. Later estimates of Patriot's effectiveness range widely. Further, there is at least one incident of a software error causing a Patriot missile to fail, resulting in deaths. Unclassified evidence on Scud interception is lacking. The higher estimates are based on the percentage of Scud warheads which were known to have impacted and exploded compared to the number of Scud missiles launched, but other factors such as duds, misses and impacts which were not reported confound these. Some Scud variations were re-engineered in a manner outside their original tolerance, and said to have frequently failed or broken up in flight. The lowest estimates are typically based upon the number of interceptions where there is proof that the warhead was hit by at least one missile, but due to the way the Al-Hussein (Scud derivative) missiles broke up in flight, it was often hard to tell which piece was the warhead, and there were few radar tracks which were actually stored which could be analyzed later. Realistically the actual performance will not be known for many years. The U.S. Army and the manufacturers maintain the Patriot delivered a "miracle performance" in the Gulf War.

Global Positioning System units were key in enabling coalition units to navigate easily across the desert.

Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and satellite communication systems were also important.

See also

• 2003 invasion of Iraq
• Arms sales to Iraq 1973-1990
• British Army
• The Gulf War Did Not Take Place
• Gulf War Military Awards
• Gulf War syndrome
• Highway of Death
• Iraq disarmament crisis timeline 1990-1996, 1997-2000, 2001-2003
• Iraq War
• Middle East conflict
• Military history
• Military history of the United States
• List of Gulf War military equipment
• Lion of Babylon tank

Films about the Gulf War

• Bravo Two Zero
• Courage Under Fire
• Jarhead
• Live From Baghdad
• Three Kings

Further reading

• Felicity Arbuthnot. Allies Deliberately Poisoned Iraq Public Water Supply In Gulf War September 17, 2000. Sunday Herald (Scotland)
• Rick Atkinson and Ann Devroy. U.S. Claims Iraqi Nuclear Reactors Hit Hard Jan 12, 1991. Washington Post.
• Mitchell Bard. The Gulf War. Jewish virtual library.
• BBC News. Timeline: War in the Gulf August 2000.
• William Blum. Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II 1995. Common Courage Press. ISBN 1-56751-052-3
• Christoper Bolkom and Jonathan Pike. Attack Aircraft Proliferation: Areas for Concern
• Miland Brown. First Persian Gulf War
• Daniel Forbes. Gulf War crimes? May 15, 2000. Salon Magazine.
• T. M. Hawley. Against the Fires of Hell: The Environmental Disaster of the Gulf War. 1992. ISBN 0-15-103969-0.
• Dilip Hiro. Desert Shield to Desert Storm: The Second Gulf War. 1992. Routledge.
• Ronald Andrew Hoskinson and Norman Jarvis. Gulf War Photo Gallery 1994.
• Gilles Kepel. "From the Gulf War to the Taliban Jihad." Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. 2002.
• Allan Little. Iraq coming in from the cold? December 1, 1997. BBC.
• John MacArthur. Independent Policy Forum Luncheon Honoring
• Alan Munro. Arab Storm: Politics and Diplomacy Behind the Gulf War I.B. Tauris. 2006. ISBN 1-84511-128-1.
• Naval Historical Center. The United States Navy in Desert Shield/Desert Storm May 15, 1991.
• Larry A. Niksch and Robert G. Sutter. Japan's Response to the Persian Gulf Crisis: Implications for U.S.-Japan Relations May 23, 1991. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress.
• Paul William Roberts, The Demonic Comedy: In the Baghdad of Saddam Hussein
• Micah Sifry and Christopher Cerf. The Gulf War Reader. 1991. ISBN 0-8129-1947-5.
• Jean Edward Smith, George Bush's War, New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1992.
• Peter Turnley. The Unseen Gulf War (photo essay) December 2002.
• Paul Walker and Eric Stambler. ...and the dirty little weapons 1991. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol 47, Number 4.
• Andre Gunder Frank. Third World War in the Gulf: A New World Order May 20, 1991. Political Economy Notebooks for Study and Research, no. 14, pp. 5-34.
• PBS Frontline. The Gulf War: an in-depth examination of the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf crisis
• Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Chapter 6

References & Notes

1. The reported number of countries participating in the Coalition varies according to source. These variations may be in part be due to uncertainty over what level of participation constitutes being a Coalition member, and vagueness over the organization timeline of the Coalition. Examples of count variations include: an Arab anti-Gulf War essay - 31; CNN - 34;an Arab media site - 36; the Heritage Foundation (a US conservative thinktank citing a 1991 Department of Defense report) - 38;US Institute of Medicine report on Gulf War Veterans' Health - 39. The number of Coalition members has been reported to be as low as 19 at the beginning of the air campaign.
2. ^ Douglas A. Borer (2003). "Inverse Engagement: Lessons from US-Iraq Relations, 1982-1990". U.S. Army Professional Writing Collection. U.S. Army. Retrieved 2006-10-12. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help); Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
3. "Arms transfers to Iraq, 1970-2004". Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Retrieved 2006-10-12. {{cite web}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
4. Donald W. Riegle, Jr. (1994-05-24). "The Riegle Report: U.S. Chemical and Biological Warfare-Related Dual Use Exports to Iraq and their Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of the Gulf War". Gulf War Veterans Resource Pages. Retrieved 2006-10-12. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help); Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
5. Joyce Battle. "Shaking Hands with Saddam Hussein: The U.S. Tilts toward Iraq, 1980-1984". National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82. The National Security Archive. Retrieved 2006-10-12. {{cite web}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
6. "How America armed Iraq". Sunday Herald. 2004-06-13. Retrieved 2006-10-12. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help); Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
7. Allen I. Mendelowitz. "Iraq's Participation in the Commodity Credit Corporation's GSM-102/103 Export Credit Guarantee Programs" (PDF). United States General Accounting Office. {{cite web}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
8. Claiborne Pell (1988-09-08). "A bill entitled the "Prevention of Genocide Act of 1988"". The Library of Congress. Retrieved 2006-10-12. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help); Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
9. "National Security Directive 26" (PDF). The White House. 1988-10-02. Retrieved 2006-10-12. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help); Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
10. At the time of the Gulf War the United States was the only remaining nation in the world with operational battleships, due in large part to President Ronald Reagan’s "600-ship Navy" plan. After the war the United States decommissioned all four of its Iowa-class battleships, keeping two in reserve and donating two as museum ships. The remaining two were removed from the Naval Vessel Register on March 17, 2006, and are in the process of being donated for use as museum ships as well.
11. "Iraqi Air Force Equipment - Introduction". Retrieved January 18. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
12. "Apparatus of Lies: Crafting Tragedy". Retrieved December 4. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
13. ""Cheney changed his view on Iraq", by Charles Pope, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, September 29, 2004". Retrieved January 7. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
14. "frontline: the gulf war: appendix: Iraqi death toll". Retrieved December 4. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
15. Raabe, Otto G. (2001) "Answer to Question #754 Submitted to 'Ask the Experts': What are some health effects of the element uranium?" Health Physics Society. hps.org
16. Hindin R, Brugge D, Panikkar B (2005) "Teratogenicity of depleted uranium aerosols: A review from an epidemiological perspective," Environmental Health, 4:17. ehjournal.net
17. Arfsten DP, Still KR, Ritchie GD (2001) "A review of the effects of uranium and depleted uranium exposure on reproduction and fetal development," Toxicology and Industrial Health, 17:180-191. DOI
18. Centers for Disease Control (1999) "Toxicological Profile for Uranium," Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry. atsdr.cdc.gov
19. Miller, A. (2002) "Depleted uranium-catalyzed oxidative DNA damage: absence of significant alpha particle decay" Journal of Inorganic Biochemistry 91:246–252.
20. Kang H, et al. (2001) "Pregnancy Outcomes Among U.S. Gulf War Veterans: A Population-Based Survey of 30,000 Veterans," Annals of Epidemiology 11:504-511. annalsofepidemiology.org
21. Schröder H, Heimers A, Frentzel-Beyme R, Schott A, Hoffman W (2003). "Chromosome Aberration Analysis in Peripheral Lymphocytes of Gulf War and Balkans War Veterans". Radiation Protection Dosimetry. 103: 211–219.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) cerrie.org
22. "First Award for Depleted Uranium Poisoning Claim," by Martin Williams, The Herald, February 4, 2004. vitw.org
23. "MoD Forced to Pay Pension for DU Contamination," by the Campaign Against Depleted Uranium, CADU News 17 (Spring, 2004) cadu.org.uk
24. Salbu B, et al. (2004) "Oxidation states of uranium in depleted uranium particles from Kuwait," Journal of Environmental Radioactivity 78:125-135. DOI
25. Jiang GC, Aschner M (2006) "Neurotoxicity of depleted uranium: reasons for increased concern," Biological Trace Element Research 110:1-18. PMID 16679544
26. "WHO : Depleted Uranium". Retrieved December 4. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
27. "WHO : Guidance on Exposure to Deplete Uranium" (PDF). Retrieved July 24. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
28. "WHO:Depleted Uranium". Retrieved July 25. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
29. "UN Environment Program : Depleted Uranium in Bosnia and Herzegovina" (PDF). Retrieved July 25. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
30. "Army Technical Bulletin 9-1300-278:Guidelines for Safe Response to Handling, Storage, and Transportation Accidents Involving Army Tank Munitions or Armor Which Contain Depleted Uranium" (PDF). Retrieved July 25. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
31. "DOD Deployment Link: Environmental Exposure Report: TAB M - Characterizing DU Aerosols". Retrieved July 25. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
32. "DOD Deployment Link: Environmental Exposure Report: TAB G - DU Exposures in the Gulf War". Retrieved July 25. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
33. "DOD Deployment Link: Environmental Exposure Report: TAB N - TAB N – Gulf War Protective Guidance". Retrieved July 25. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
34. "Fact Sheet on the Health Effects of Depleted Uranium". Retrieved December 4. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
35. "Argonne National Labs: Physical Properties of Pertinent Uranium Compounds". Retrieved July 25. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
36. "Gulf War Veterans and Depleted Uranium". Retrieved December 4. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
37. "Royal Society : Science issues : Depleted uranium". Retrieved December 4. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
38. "Conclusions" (PDF). Retrieved December 4. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
39. "Allies Deliberately Poisoned Iraq Public Water Supply In Gulf War". Retrieved December 4. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
40. "U.S. Claims Iraqi Nuclear Reactors Hit Hard". Retrieved December 4. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
41. "The Gulf War". Retrieved December 4. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
42. "Timeline: War in the Gulf". Retrieved December 4. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
43. "Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II". Retrieved December 4. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
44. "Attack Aircraft Proliferation: Areas for Concern". Retrieved December 4. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
45. "Gulf War crimes?". Retrieved December 4. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
46. "Gulf War Photo Gallery". Retrieved December 4. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
47. "Iraq coming in from the cold?". Retrieved December 4. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
48. "Independent Policy Forum Luncheon Honoring". Retrieved December 4. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
49. "The United States Navy in Desert Shield/Desert Storm". Retrieved December 4. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
50. "Japan's Response to the Persian Gulf Crisis: Implications for U.S.-Japan Relations". Retrieved December 4. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
51. "The Unseen Gulf War (photo essay)". Retrieved December 4. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
52. "...and the dirty little weapons". Retrieved December 4. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
53. "Third World War in the Gulf: A New World Order". Retrieved December 4. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
54. "The Gulf War: an in-depth examination of the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf crisis". Retrieved December 4. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
55. "Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Chapter 6". Retrieved December 4. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)

External links

• Desert-Storm.com Online Community For Desert-Storm Veterans. Information resource about the war.
• Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports regarding the Gulf War
• CBC Digital Archives - The 1991 Gulf War

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• Gulf War
• Military history of the United States 1900-1999
• Operations involving special forces
• Wars of the United States
• Wars of the United Kingdom
• Wars of Iraq