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Battle of Warsaw (1831)

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Battle of Warsaw
Part of the Polish-Russian War 1830–1831

Russian assault on Warsaw in 1831
DateSeptember 1831
LocationWarsaw, Poland
Result Russian victory, Polish rebellion quashed
Belligerents
Russia Imperial Russia  Poland
Commanders and leaders
Russia Ivan Paskevich Poland Jan Krukowiecki
Strength
approximately 71 000 men, 360 cannons approximately 40 000 men, 200 cannons
Casualties and losses
Unknown, but significantly smaller than Polish casualties. Unknown
November Uprising

The Battle of Warsaw was fought in September 1831 between Imperial Russia and Poland. The Russians were led by Ivan Paskevich, while the Polish were led by Jan Krukowiecki. The Russians captured the Polish capital, Warsaw, crushing the November Uprising, which had begun in late 1830.

Background

In 1830 a series of revolutions struck Europe: the July Revolution in France, the Belgian Revolution and a number of smaller revolts in Italy threatened to overthrow the very framework of European politics established at the Congress of Vienna. As the Russian tsars were among the strongest advocates of that status quo, the uprising in Poland and the ousting of the tsar as the king of Poland by the Sejm and Senate of Poland on 25 January 1831 were considered a thorn in Russia's back. Russia could not send its' armies to Belgium or France before the rebellion in Poland was quelled. For that reason the capture of Warsaw, considered to be the main target in the war, was Russia's aim from the very start of hostilities.

In the course of the Uprising, the army of Russia unsuccessfully tried to capture the capital of Poland on two occasions. First in February of 1831, when forces under Field Marshal Hans Karl von Diebitsch stormed the eastern suburb of Praga. After a bloody battle at Grochów, the Polish Army successfully retreated to Warsaw and the capital remained in Polish hands.

Unable to capture Warsaw by a frontal assault, von Diebitsch devised a plan to outflank it and enter the city from the west. In the spring of 1831 he sent his forces upstream to the area of upper Vistula, where the Russian divisions were to cross the river and head back north, towards Warsaw. However, the new plan was thwarted by the staunch Polish defence in three successive battles around Wawer, Dębe Wielkie and Iganie. The Russians were forced to withdraw back towards Siedlce, where von Diebitsch soon fell ill and died of cholera - the same outbreak that killed Prussian generals Carl von Clausewitz and August Neidhardt von Gneisenau stationed in Prussian-controlled Poland at the time.

The successor of von Diebitsch as Commander in Chief of Russian forces in Poland, Count Ivan Paskevich, decided to wait for the Polish forces in other fronts to be defeated before he resumes his march on Warsaw. In June 1831 Gen. Antoni Giełgud's attack on Wilno failed and his corps was forced to cross the border with Prussia to avoid complete destruction. There the Polish force got interned and only a small detachment under Gen. Henryk Dembiński managed to rejoin the main Polish force. This secured Paskevich's northern flank and allowed his forces to devise a new plan of attack. Instead of attacking the city directly and risking yet another defeat, he intended to surround Warsaw, cut it off from other Polish-controlled areas and force it into submission.

Between 17 July and 21 July 1831 he crossed Vistula near Osiek with his main force, and headed towards Warsaw through Gąbin and Łowicz. Meanwhile other Russian forces from other theatres were also directed towards the city. Gen. Gregor von Rosen's Corps (12,000 men and 34 guns) marched almost unopposed from Brześć Litewski and reached Praga on 10 August. Gen. Theodor von Rüdiger's corps (12,000 men and 42 guns) crossed Upper Vistula at Józefów on 7 August and captured the city of Radom.

The new Commander in Chief of the Polish Army, Jan Zygmunt Skrzynecki, was also hesitant to fight a major battle. Instead, he ordered Warsaw to be fortified and allowed the Russians to cross the Vistula River unopposed, planning to force them to besiege the city. In his opinion, the war could only be won diplomatically, by interventions of the governments of the United Kingdom, Austria and France. Should those fail, Skrzynecki believed Warsaw would hold out at least several weeks of siege, after which the main bulk of the Polish Army would still be intact to fight a decisive battle against the Russians, who by then would be cut-out from their rear by the Vistula river. However, on 10 August 1831 Skrzynecki was forced to resign and was replaced by Henryk Dembiński, the military governor of Warsaw.

Prelude

Battlefield

A plan of Polish field fortifications (north is to the right)
1831 map of Warsaw, with Lubomirski Ramparts marked in red. The main line of Polish defences followed it closely.

In late 18th century and early 19th century Warsaw experienced a period of fast growth. However, as Poland was going through a period of turmoil and constant devastating wars, it lacked modern permanent fortifications. To make up for it, three lines of earthworks, ramparts and palisades were constructed on both sides of the Vistula river. The inner, third line ran approximately along the Lubomirski Ramparts demolished only a couple of years before the outbreak of the uprising. It was a continuous line of earthworks 3 metres (9.8 ft) high, strengthened by numerous forts and fortified houses.

The second line of defences consisted of forts located 400 to 600 metres (1,300 to 2,000 ft) in front of the inner line of defences. The strongest forts were located along the road towards Kalisz. The first, outer line of defences consisted of smaller forts and ramparts running along a semi-circular line from Szopy, through Rakowiec, Wola and Parysów to the banks of Vistula river. The fortified outposts of the outer line were located between 1.5 and 3 kilometres (0.93 and 1.86 mi) in front of the third line. Their purpose was to withstand the initial attacks and divide the attacking Russian forces into smaller groups. There were five large groups of earthworks of the outer line:

The space between the large fortifications was covered by a series of smaller redans (chevron-shaped forts) and barkans (trapezoidal forts). The strongest fortification in the outer line of defences was the Fort No. 56 in the suburb of Wola, built around the St Lawrence's Church. It was supported by a Lunette No. 57 located right in front of it and two additional forts (Nos. 54 and 55) to the south of it. The post of the headquarters was located in Fort No. 73 between Rakowiec and the Jerozolimskie Gate.

Polish headquarters decided to defend the outer line of defences, the furthest from the densely-populated areas. The reason was that in 1830s roughly 53% of buildings (out of 3148 houses in Warsaw) were made of wood and a possible fire could easily destroy the city. However, in case the enemy broke through all three lines of defences, the city centre was also fortified with 30 barricades, embrasures cut through the walls of several buildings and mines hidden beneath major street crossings.

Opposing forces

By 20 August 1831 Warsaw was almost entirely encircled by the Russians. Count Paskevich had at his disposal a formidable force. His main force on the left bank of the Vistula consisted of between 54,000 and 55,000 soldiers, supported by 324 guns of various calibres. Additional 7000 soldiers and 20 guns guarded the river crossings. In addition to Paskevich's main force, the II Corps under Gen. Cyprian von Kreutz (21,000 soldiers, 90 guns) was heading towards the city from Osiek. Meanwhile von Rüdiger's corps was tied down around Radom, fighting a large Polish corps under Gen. Samuel Różycki.

By 5 September 1831 the main Russian force rose to 78,500 men at arms, including 2000 sappers, 54,000 infantry, 17,200 cavalry. Russian artillery outnumbered the Polish and had 382 cannons and 8 mortars manned by 7,300 men. The forces assaulting Warsaw were divided as follows:

While superior, the Russian force faced severe logistical problems. Count Paskevich's army was too big to sustain on food confiscated from captured lands. It relied on provisions transported from Russia, either directly through Polish territory or through - theoretically neutral - Prussia. However, the epidemic of cholera brought to Poland and East Prussia by Russian soldiers forced the Prussian authorities to close their borders to Russian transports. To avoid starving his army, Paskevich ordered two permanent bridges built across Vistula, in Góra and Podgórze. However, only the latter one had been completed by the start of the Russian assault of Warsaw.

The Polish Army in early September 1831 numbered around 62,000 men in total. The garrison of the city itself numbered some 31,100 infantry and 3800 cavalry. It was divided onto the following units:

  • I Corps (Gen. Jan Nepomucen Umiński) - 18,100 infantry, 1400 cavalry, 34 guns
  • Reserve Corps (Gen. Henryk Dembiński) - 11,500 infantry, 1700 cavalry, 12 guns
  • Garrison of Warsaw and Praga - 1361 infantry, 524 cavalry

The artillery, including organic artillery of infantry and cavalry divisions, as well as artillery of the forts, included 228 pieces of artillery and 21 Congreve rocket batteries, manned by 4554 soldiers of the regular army and 200 members of the National Guard.

The crew was insufficient to man all the defences and some forts had to be abandoned. While there were roughly 15,000 able-bodied members of Straż Bezpieczeństwa, Gwardia Narodowa and Jewish City Guard militias willing to join the fight, the army refused to provide them with arms for fear of losing control over the unruly plebeians.

The situation of the defenders was critical, as the city was home to over 175,000 civilians, refugees, sick and wounded. The defenders were low on provisions and food supplies were far from adequate. The epidemic of cholera brought to Poland by Russian troops struck Warsaw as well, between 16 May and 20 August 4734 people fell ill and 2524 died.

In addition, on 15 August a riot broke out in the city, with up to 3000 angry civilians and soldiers killing suspected spies and traitors. Between 36 and 60 people were killed. The order was restored, but the situation in the besieged city remained fragile. On the other hand the ammunition supplies were excellent and would "allow the Polish Army to fight not one, but three major battles". The Warsaw Arsenal alone stored roughly 3 million rifle rounds and 60,000 cannon shots, that is roughly 200 shots per cannon.

Both sides were trained in a similar manner and used similar equipment. The standard rifle for both sides were the Model 1808 flintlock musket (a clone of the Charleville musket) and its' modification, the Model 1826 Musket, with effective fire range not exceeding roughly 250 metres (820 ft). Some units of the Polish infantry were still armed with hunting rifles or war scythes, but contrary to common misconception the Kosynierzy were but a small minority of Polish forces. The heavy artillery used was mostly 6-pounders and 12-pounders, while heavier artillery included 20-pounders ("half-pood") and 10-pounders ("quarter-pood") cannons. Also, the forces of both sides were a mixture of old, battle-hardened soldiers trained in regular units before the war, and new, unproven recruits.

The Polish Army was made up primarily of volunteers and organised along the lines of Napoleon Bonaparte's army, which meant that there were no corporal punishments in the military handbooks and the soldiers were highly-motivated. However, the excellent morale of the first months of the uprising were long gone by the early days of September. A long string of defeats, partial victories, retreats and high command's indecisiveness, coupled with frequent changes in command structure (between 12 and 20 August the post of Commander-in-Chief changed hands four times) meant that the soldiers' morale was low. Also, most of the generals in Warsaw lacked faith in the aims of the uprising set by the more liberal-minded members of Sejm and instead were "only doing their job", hoping the status quo would return as soon as the Tsar is forced to stand by his promises. The generals supporting the idea of carrying-on with the fight (Umiński, Dembiński, Józef Bem, Kazimierz Małachowski) were in charge in early September, but they were outnumbered by generals, who were willing to sign an armistice with the Russians, even against the will of the Sejm.

By contrast the Russian forces' morale was record-high. The Russian commanders had ample experience in siege operations, Paskevich himself had captured at least six fortified cities in his career, including the capture of Erevan and Abbas-Abbad in the Russo-Persian War of 1826 and the battle of Akhalzic and siege of Kars during the Russo-Turkish War of 1828.

Battle

Initial clashes

Facing logistical problems, the new Polish Commander in Chief Jan Krukowiecki, who replaced Dembiński in mid-August, ordered a sortie on the right-bank. Like his predecessor, Krukowiecki was a conservatist and believed the main aim of the November Uprising was the return of status quo ante with the tsars of Russia as kings of Poland, but respecting the constitution and Polish laws. Unlike Skrzynecki however, he believed foreign intervention to be unrealistic. Instead he wanted to force the Russians to return to peace talks by either defeating the Russian forces of von Rosen and von Rüdiger, breaking the siege or by defeating the assault attempts.

According to the new strategy, the forces under Girolamo Ramorino and Tomasz Łubieński were to leave the city and stay on the right bank of the Vistula, harass the Russian forces under von Rosen and von Rüdiger, capture the river crossings at Osiek, provide the city with supplies and force Paskevich to divert some of his forces to fight them. Both forces left the city between 16 and 20 August 1831. Tomasz Łubieński's Corps headed towards Płock and indeed managed to break the encirclement and deliver much-needed supplies to Warsaw. His forces also broke the northern line of communications between Pashevich's forces and East Prussia. Meanwhile Girolamo Ramorino's II Corps operating in Podlachia defeated von Rosen's Corps in a number of clashes, notably in the battles of Międzyrzec and Rogoźnica. However, Ramorino's indecisiveness and disregard for orders allowed the defeated and numerically-inferior Russians to retreat towards Brześć Litewski. The Russian corps thus avoided complete destruction.

The departure of regular units under Ramorino and Łubieński depleted the forces of the defenders, further weakening the crew manning the first line of defence. The entire garrison dropped to merely 28,000 regular soldiers and 10,000 fresh troops, often armed only with scythes, badly-equipped and poorly-trained.

Having defeated von Rosen at Międzyrzec on 29 August, Ramorino's forces were ordered to return to Siedlce, but Ramorino disregarded that order and followed von Rosen all the way towards Brześć. The order to return through Łuków to Siedlce was repeated on 4 September. From there the a forcible march could allow the II Corps to cross Vistula to the south of Warsaw and attack Paskevich from the rear, or rejoin the bulk of the Polish Army defending Warsaw. However, the repeated order was also ignored. In effect a large part of Polish forces, composed mostly of seasoned soldiers, high on morale thanks to recent victories, was wandering aimlessly through Podlachia, only a couple of days' march from Warsaw. In the end, instead of coming to the aid of Warsaw or following the fleeing forces of von Rosen, Ramorino waited in Podlachia for a week, and then headed south, away from the enemy.

On 4 September Paskevich sent an envoy to Warsaw requesting surrender and promising the revision of the constitution. However, only three out of ten members of the Diplomatic Commission voted in favour of further negotiations. In the end on 5 September the Russian commander was informed that the only acceptable solution has already been made known to all in the declaration of the Sejm. In short, the Poles requested that all lands grabbed by Russia in the effect of the partitions of Poland be reattached to Poland, and that the act of deposition of Nicholas I as the king of Poland (of 25 January 1831) was still valid.

In the eve of the battle, the Russian Army moved from its' positions in villages surrounding Warsaw (Nadarzyn, Wolica, Falenty, Dawidy and Raszyn) closer to Polish positions. The Guards started moving towards the village of Opacze Wielkie, the grenadiers, Cavalry Corps and the I Infantry Corps moved to the road to Kalisz near the village of Szamoty, while the II Infantry Corps moved to Włochy. An infantry division under Muraviev occupied the fields between Okęcie and Rakowiec, and Cavalry Division of Nostitz moved to Zbarż. To complete the encirclement, the 2nd Light Division under Strandman took positions at the road towards Lublin near Służew, while Stepan Khilkov's Cavalry Division moved to Chrzanów. The supply trains and reserves were left in Nadarzyn.

Battle plans

Although far from decisive, the actions of Ramorino and Łubieński forced the hand of Paskevich. Initially opposing the idea of an all-out assault of the city, Paskevich was low on provisions and supplies: by early September the main Russian force had only 5 days' worth of food and horse fodder. On 28 August Paskevich caved in to some of his generals' advice and ordered preparation of a general attack. After several days of quarrels within the Russian staff, it was decided on 4 September that the main thrust should be aimed at the strongest Polish positions behind the suburb of Wola. The main thrust of the Russian attack was directed at the central rampart in Wola, the Fort No. 56, as well as the fortifications surrounding it. The Russian I Infantry Corps was to storm Fort No. 57 and continue towards Forts 56 and 58. The II Infantry Corps was to focus on nearby Forts No. 54 and 55. Other sectors of the front were to be only lightly pressed by diversionary attacks. Most probably Paskevich did not want to enter the city itself, and counted on the Polish defenders to abandon the city or surrender once the outer ring of defences is pierced and the city centre is threatened with fire.

Meanwhile the Polish plan was based on fixed defence of the front line, with the forces under Umiński and Dembiński sheltered behind the second line of defences and acting as a mobile reserve, together with divisional artillery and cavalry. Umiński's Corps was to cover the southern sector of the front, a line of approximately 7.1 kilometres (4.4 mi) from road to Puławy, through the road towards Kraków, to the line connecting the Fort 18 and Fort 74. Forces under Dembiński were to defend the western and northern sector, along a line of approximately 9.6 kilometres (6.0 mi) running from Redoubt No. 54 to the suburb of Marymont. Most of the Polish forces were amassed in the southern part of the city, as the Polish headquarters falsely assumed, that the Russians would attack the weakest part of the defences, around Królikarnia, the suburbs of Mokotów and Czerniaków.

September 6

Enemy movements alerted Polish observation posts located atop the Holy Trinity Church and Astronomical Observatory at Ujazdów Avenue.. At 2:00 Polish defenders were put on alert. The attack started around 4:00. Polish soldiers manning forts No. 54 and 57 were the first to notice enemy movement, Fort No. 54 opened fire on approaching Russians immediately.

Soon dense black powder smoke covered the battlefield. Because of that the commanders of the second line outposts did not open fire with their artillery on the approaching Russians, unable to see their progress. Contrary to the battle plan, the second line did not send reinforcements to the first either. This was particularly important in the case of Forts 54 and 56, as they had to face the enemy alone, without the support of Forts No. 21, 22 and 23 located behind them.

The most important positions in the suburb of Wola received only token reinforcements from the main reserve and were forced to fight alone and in isolation.

The group of forts of the outer line near the village of Rakowiec had been abandoned by the Poles already in early September, and were captured by Russian infantry without a fight.

The Poles tried to recapture the main positions in Wola, but two consecutive counter-attacks around 11:00 failed. After capturing the redoubts in Wola, Paskevich sent another envoy to Warsaw, but the hastily called session of the Parliament renounced his offer of a cease-fire. Around 14:30 the attacks resumed along the entire front-line. Paskevich himself was lightly wounded by a Polish canister shot, but recovered soon afterwards.

By that point the battle plan of the Russians was still not clear to the Polish Commander-in-Chief Gen. Krukowiecki. Unsure whether the main attack is on Wola or the forts around Królikarnia, he did not reassign any sizeable infantry force to the western front, despite the fact that the southern line was safely in Polish hands and repeated Russian attacks there were being repelled. Only a small detachment of horse artillery was dispatched to the second line near Wola.

In the evening Gen. Krukowiecki agreed to Paskevich's terms. The cease-fire agreement (apparently never signed on paper) stipulated that the Polish Army was free to leave the city, a two-day cease fire would come into effect and that the city of Warsaw would be spared the horrors it experienced during the 1794 siege. No political clauses were included.

September 7

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At 3:00 the cease-fire signed the previous day came into effect. The Polish Army withdrew to the other side of Vistula and continued north towards the Modlin Fortress. The Sejm, Senate and many civilians also left the city "in grim silence". Many soldiers and officers however, including high-ranking officers, decided to stay in the city and lay down their arms. Up to 5000 soldiers stayed in Warsaw, along with roughly 600 officers, among them generals Krukowiecki, Małachowski, Chrzanowski and Prądzyński. The food stores were opened and their contents was distributed among the civilians.

In the evening of the following day Grand Duke Michail Pavlovich entered the city leading his Imperial Guard. Warsaw capitulated.

Aftermath

"Order reigns in Warsaw", a caricature by J.J. Grandville, mocking Horace Sébastiani's declaration to the French Chamber of Deputies

Although no large-scale evacuation of supplies from Warsaw was ordered, the Modlin Fortress was well-prepared for a lengthy siege. Its' magazines contained over 25 thousand cannon rounds, almost 900 thousand musket and rifle rounds and enough provisions for several months of full siege. Despite the fall of Warsaw, also the treasury of the Polish government was still intact and contained more than 6.5 million złotys.

The fall of Warsaw was synonymous with the fall of entire Poland, both to Poles and to foreigners. Soon afterwards the tsar practically dismantled the Kingdom of Poland: its' constitution was abolished, the government given to Russian officials and its' Warsaw University closed.

The news of the fall of Warsaw spread quickly throughout the world and incited a wave of sympathy towards Poles and their plight. Several towns in the United States voted to change their names to Warsaw after the news of the battle reached their residents, among them Warsaw, Virginia and Warsaw, Kentucky.

Shortly after the battle, in December 1831, the tsarist authorities issued a "For the Taking of Warsaw by Assault in 1831" Medal awarded to Russian veterans of the battle. Soon afterwards a monument "To the Captors of Warsaw" was constructed not far from the site once occupied by Redoubt No. 54. Demolished after Poland regained independence in 1918, the spot is now occupied by a post-war monument to Juliusz Konstanty Ordon and his soldiers. There are plans to move the monument closer to where the actual Redoubt was.

Casualties

Early official Russian data assert that the total number of casualties were between 8 and 10 thousand killed and wounded for the Russian side, and between 6 and 7 thousand for the Polish.

Other sources give the total Polish casualties as 9000

References

Notes

  1. ^ Strzeżek (1998), p. 7
  2. ^ Strzeżek (1998), pp. 9-10
  3. ^ Black, pp. 41-42
  4. ^ Strzeżek (1996), pp. 19-22
  5. Zwierkowski, p. 497
  6. ^ Strzeżek (1998), pp. 11-12
  7. ^ Durand, pp. 230-243
  8. ^ Strzeżek (1998), pp. 21-24
  9. ^ Strzeżek (1998), pp. 17-19
  10. ^ Ringelblum, p. 30
  11. Nieuważny, p. 1
  12. Strzeżek (1996), p. 207
  13. ^ Strzeżek (1996), p. 23
  14. ^ Strzeżek (1998), pp. 24-26
  15. ^ Strzeżek (1998), pp. 28-30
  16. ^ Strzeżek (1998), pp. 14-16
  17. ^ Strzeżek (1996), pp. 15-16
  18. ^ Kasparek, pp. 168-170
  19. ^ Laskowski, pp. 140-144
  20. ^ Strzeżek (1998), p. 12
  21. ^ Łojek, pp. 122-124
  22. ^ Strzeżek (1998), pp. 27-28
  23. ^ Strzeżek (1996), p. 53
  24. ^ Strzeżek (1996), p. 59
  25. Tokarz (1917), p. 248
  26. ^ Strzeżek (1996), p. 103
  27. Tucker, pp. 1156-1157
  28. Barber, pp. 30, 130
  29. rusempire.ru, p. 1
  30. ^ Kraj, p. 1
  31. Jacques, p. 1094

Footnotes

  • Polish fortifications surrounding Warsaw in 1831 are identified in Polish historiography by either their number alone ("Dzieło nr. 56" - "Work No. 56") or by both their number and type, as in "Reduta No. 56", "Luneta No. 71", "Szaniec No. 66", and so on. For the sake of simplicity this article calls all fortifications Forts and refers to their number.

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