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Allegations of manipulated economic data in the Islamic Republic of Iran are frequently cited by economists examining the country, pointing to differences between government-released statistics and other sources. The following sections show some contradiction between official data and other sources.

Background

The collapse of autocracies is frequently driven by large-scale public mobilization and collective action. The decision of an individual to participate in such actions, including strikes and protests, is often influenced by her perception of the willingness of others to engage in similar efforts. Consequently, autocratic governments frequently manipulate economic data to alter public perceptions regarding the true state of the economy. For example, empirical evidence suggest that autocracies inflate their reported growth rates by as much as 35%. By presenting a misleadingly positive portrayal, such regimes discourage the belief that the economy is struggling and prevent the populace from perceiving widespread discontent, thereby reducing the likelihood of mass demonstrations and potential regime change.

Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

In 2020-2023 the official data showed an substantial growth rate of the GDP per capita of Iran. On the other hand, as of 2024 Iran suffers from a major energy crisis with many of its refineries and power plants operating below capacity. Iran's energy supply is currently unstable, with frequent blackouts and shortages affecting daily life, industries, and essential services. This shortage in basic daily necessities is a potential indicator of a worse economic performance than the one reflected by the official data.

In early 2020, there were conflicting reports regarding Iran's economic performance for the first nine months of 2019. During the same year, Iran's minister of economy, Farhad Dejpasand, claimed significant growth in the agricultural sector and a 7.5% increase in the industrial sector, indicating positive growth in the non-oil economy. Contrarily, Iran's Statistical Center reported an overall economic contraction of 7.6% when including oil revenues, and a zero growth rate excluding oil, suggesting instead a substantial economic downturn.

Hassan Rouhani's claim of 7.4% economic growth during his presidency faced criticism from Iranian economists and lawmakers, who questioned the accuracy and transparency of the figures. Critics argued that the reported growth lacked correlation with industrial output or employment improvements, suggesting the data may have been manipulated to present a more favorable image of Iran's economy.

The size of the public sector workforce

According to the official statistics the 14.77% of Iranian employees work in the public sector. This number is comparable to OECD countries.

The average participation rate in labor force in the OECD countries is 78.8%. However, the equivalent rate is Iran is only about 41%. The Islamic Republic of Iran pay approximately 8 million individuals. Roughly 3 million are formally employed across the three branches of government, the armed forces, and leadership institutions. These include bureaucratic staff, civil servants, and uniformed military personnel. Beyond the formal government structure, around 2.3 million Iranians are employed in quasi-governmental entities, including state-controlled companies, national banks, municipalities, and the Islamic Azad University. Additionally, there are approximately 2.5 million pensioners who receive stipends, often from the Relief Committee, a charitable organization under state control. This employment network means that nearly one in ten Iranian citizens has a regular financial relationship with the state.

A significant portion of state employment falls under institutions directly controlled by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Key entities include:

• Mostazafan Foundation: Employing approximately 49,500 individuals across 190 holdings and companies, this institution manages significant economic assets and is closely tied to the Supreme Leader's financial interests.
• Astan Quds Razavi: With over 16,000 employees, it manages the Imam Reza Shrine in Mashhad, overseeing both religious affairs and extensive business operations.
• Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB): As the state's primary media outlet, IRIB employs around 14,600 people, playing a key role in information control and propaganda dissemination.
• Relief Committee: This charitable organization employs 11,800 individuals, distributing aid while serving as a tool for regime influence over economically vulnerable populations.
• Execution of Imam Khomeini's Order (EIKO): This powerful financial conglomerate employs about 7,400 people, managing vast state assets through subsidiaries like the Tadbir Economic Development Group.
• Barakat Pharmaceutical Group: A key subsidiary of EIKO, Barakat employs approximately 4,000 individuals and gained prominence for producing the COVIran Barekat vaccine during the COVID-19 pandemic.
• Islamic Propagation Organization: Employing 1,700 individuals, this body focuses on ideological control through cultural events, state rallies, and media outlets like Mehr News Agency.
• Islamic Revolution Art Organization (Art Bureau): With 642 employees, this organization produces state-approved cultural works, including propaganda films and literature.
• Special Clerical Court: A judicial body with 271 staff members, this institution handles cases involving clerics, often targeting dissent within the clergy itself.

Defense burden

According to the official data as of 2023 Iran spends on national defense 10.3 billion UDS or 2.1% of its GDP. This percentage is similar to countries like UK, France and Finland.

According to the 2025 budget bill the government will provide the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and the Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) with additional 12 billions oil valued in euros, which they can then sell to foreign buyers.

In addition Iran finances Hezbollah, the Yemeni Houthis, Iraqi militia, and Hamas. The average annual budget allocated to funding of Iran's proxies is estimated to be US$1.6 billion. In addition, Iran invested US$50 billion to secure the Assad regime in Syria, an investment that proved to be a failed investment in light of the termination of Assad regime.

When estimating the defense expenditure of Iran one must take into account the cost of the nuclear program and its total economic costs. The estimate cost of Iran's nuclear program are US$500 billion. As a result of the nuclear program Iran was subject to international sanctions. The sanctions caused a long stagnation which cost Iran US$1.2 trillion over 12 years. An additional cost inflicted on Iran as a result of its defense spendings, and their nature, and the international sanctions is a major reduction in foreign direct investments (FDI). From 2011 to 2021 Iran experienced a reduction of approximately 80% in FDI.

Inflation data

The official inflation rate in Iran in 2023 was 44.58%. According to Numbeo From 2010 to 2023 the price of milk in Tehran increased by 140% (compared to 65% in Berlin), the price bread increased by 235% (compared to -1% in Berlin), the price of eggs increased by 163% (compared to 98% in Berlin), the price of potatoes increase from 2012 to 2023 by 199% (compared to 118% in Berlin), the price of rice increase from 2011 to 2023 by 112% (compared to 40% in Berlin), and the price of chicken fillets increase from 2011 to 2023 by 185% (compared to 42% in Berlin).

The excessive price increases, especially of food, caused people to perceive inflation rates higher than the official ones. Moreover, the surge of prices caused salaries not to cover the basic needs. The minimum cost of living is in Iran estimated at $500, yet workers’ wages stand at merely $136. The rapid erosion in salaries purchasing power raised a suspicion that the true inflation rate in higher than the reported one. Moreover, the Iranian media claimed that the true inflation rate in 2023 was 70%.

Fake academic degrees

Iran suffers from over-education and over-supply of academic degrees. In 2015–2016, over 4.3 million students were enrolled in universities in Iran, which accounts for more than 5% of the country's total population, or 7.4% of its adult population (aged 19 and above). In compression, in 2016, 20.4 million students, or a little over 6% of the U.S. population (8.3% of the U.S. adult population aged 19 and above), attended college. The U.S. economy was then approximately 47 times the size of Iran's, and many of the graduates from U.S. colleges and universities are foreign nationals, who will likely contribute to the labor forces of their home countries.

The salaries of workers in the Iranian public service is considerably affected by the academic degree of the worker. A Government Officer in Iran with a high school education can earn an average salary of 547,200,700 IRR. A Government Officer in Iran with a certificate or diploma education can earn an average salary of 627,600,400 IRR. A Government Officer in Iran with a bachelor's degree education can earn an average salary of 845,998,100 IRR. A Government Officer in Iran with a master's degree education can earn an average salary of 1,064,400,600 IRR. Finally, a government officer with Doctorate earns a salary of 1,322,097,006 IRR.

The considerable wage premium to degrees, a premium that does not take into account the quality of the degree created an industry of fake degrees. Many individuals in Iran have turned to the underground market for fake diplomas and doctoral degrees. These counterfeit credentials are sold to those who seek to improve their career prospects or gain political favor. This market is not limited to lower-tier degrees but also extends to advanced academic qualifications, including doctoral degrees, which are often seen as essential for gaining prestige and advancing in the professional world. The prices for such degrees can be very high, with PhDs being sold for as much as $9,000.

The state of inequality

According the inequality dataset of the world bank the Gini index in Iran in 2002 was 34.8. a level that is considered to be quite modest.

A closer look at the data reveals the top 10% holds 52.7% of the national income, a larger share than USA or European countries.

Moreover, the Statistical Center of Iran 2024 report show a growing income gap between social classes in urban areas. According to the data, income inequality has been rising.

The inequality is present in the public service, many Iranian state employees face significant financial hardship. Salaries for many of these positions can be as low as $200 per month. Nevertheless, not all state employees earn low wages. Some Majlis representatives receive monthly salaries ranging from 200 to 250 million tomans (or more than $59,172 according to the exchange rate of January 2024). Additionally, they receive extra amounts during religious holidays and on “Parliament Day” and “Employee Day,” along with benefits like “Nowruz and Yalda Night snacks.

The inequality is also present in water supply: In Tehran impoverished districts struggle with inadequate water provision and hazardous water quality, while affluent areas, housing many of the nation's economic elite—including high-ranking government and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officials - are largely exempt from these hardships. These privileged neighborhoods maintain numerous private swimming pools and spacious green spaces.

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• Economy of Iran